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THE CONSITERATION GP :THS YALTA CONFERENCE
AS AN EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT :
The story of the Yalta Conference is a complex and a difficult 
one. The Yalta Conference was one of a series of important conferences 
which were held among the Allies during the Second World War, Yalta 
was also the second, and the last, meeting between President Roosevelt, 
Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin in a face-to-face situation. 
The Axis powers of Hitler and Mussolini along with the Empire of 
Japan had been conducting a ravaging war with the Allies in many areas 
of the world. At Yalta, when the defeat of the European belligerents 
was in sight, the Big had a two-fold task. On© task involved
the establishment of the foundations of peace, hopefully a lasting 
peace, and the second was designed to put Europe back together again, 
geographically and politically.
To this date, there has been no single formal conference to 
determine a peace treaty after World Wax II, but a series of confer­
ences from the signing of the Atlantic Charter to the Potsdam Confer­
ence mark the way, Yalta was the most important, for it was there that 
Franklin D, Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin established 
the Allied plans for the final military victory and agreed on the par­
titioning of Germany and on certain plans for future peace.
Not only was the Yalta Conference the most important Allied 
conference held during the war, but it also became the most controversial.
1
2Those who criticise and analyse this conference seem to fall into 
three categories. First there are those who show a lack of under­
standing of American objectives in the conduct of the war and in 
America’s efforts during the war to lay a foundation for a peaceful 
post-war era. Secondly, there are those who, for reasons best known 
to themselves, have distorted and perverted the facts to a point at 
which their statements have little or no basis in reality. The 
third category consists of those who, in a scholarly and-objective 
manner, try to establish the truth about the Yalta Conference,
Probably the most troublesome problem one encounters when dealing 
with the Yalta Conference is that there are very few critics in the 
third category. Much of the writing dealing with Yalta is presented 
in a biased or prejudiced manner, It is the historian’s task to 
discover the truth, and that task becomes a difficult one when the 
subject is as emotional, complex, and controversial as the Yalta 
Conference,
When studying the Yalta Conference and its relation to United 
States foreign policy, a topic of major concern is Franklin D, Roose­
velt’s role, Throughout Roosevelt’s four presidential administrations, 
he assumed a tremendous amount of political power. With his election 
to the presidency in 1932, Roosevelt was confronted with one of the 
worst problems the United States has ever faced, the Great Depression, 
President Roosevelt did not hesitate to meet the emergency! he operated 
on the United States’ economy much as a surgeon operates on a cancerous
3body. During 'the New Deal era* Roosevelt became accustomed to 
wielding the power with which his high office was endowed, Presi~ 
dent Roosevelt, in collaboration with his companions in the "Brain 
Trust," was to become the innovator of numerous federal agencies 
with the purposes of relief, reform and recovery. When an act was 
proved unconstitutional, a new one was often created to replace the 
discarded one, as when the National Industrial Recovery Act Section 
7a was replaced by the Wagner Act or the first and second Agricul­
tural Adjustment Act. The American populace became used to the 
"fireside chats" in which Resident Roosevelt explained the new 
programs that the Federal government would be unfolding. In fact, 
the Federal government began delving into areas that were regarded 
as being "off limits," the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Works 
Progress Administration and the National Industrial Recovery Act 
being prime examples, Resident Roosevelt*s use of his executive 
power and his power*s influence was clearly seen in the 1937 "court- 
packing" attempt and the 1938 purge of the Democratic Party’s Con- 
gres^r^a and Senators who opposed President Roosevelt and the New 
Deal,
The source of much of the criticism of the New Deal lies in 
the Federal government's increasing role on the domestic scene. The 
government became an employment agency, an electric power company, 
an old-age insurance company, and a referee for commercial interests. 
President Roosevelt, as the head of the executive branch, was accused
4of becoming a dictator and some compared his influence with the 
increasing power of Germany*s Adolf Hitler arid Italy’s Benito Musso­
lini,
The purpose of this study is to show that with the emergence 
of'World wax II and throughout the war itself, President Roosevelt 
increased the use of his executive powers and in particular expanded 
the uses of the executive agreement* The executive agreement, given 
to the president in his role as the United States* chief diplomat, 
was used by President Roosevelt from the time of the Fifty Destroyers 
Deal through the Yalta Conference. Justice Sutherland in 1936 gave 
the Supreme Court’s approval "on the very delicate, plenary and 
exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the government 
in the field of international relations."* The use of the executive 
agreement will be traced through the major military and military- 
political conferences held during the Second World War that finally 
cumulated at Yalta in February of 1945»
The first major military-political conference in which President 
Roosevelt participated was the meeting with Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill, Ihat resulted in the Atlantic Charter. In August of 
1941, the two leaders met off the coast of Newfoundland in a confer­
ence that was kept secret due to the threat of German submarines. The 
three chief topics to be discussed were lend-lease, common defense, and
*United States v, Curtiss Wright Corporation, L99» U. S. 304 
(1936)« 819,
5a joint policy against Japan concerning her aggression in the Fax 
East® The so-called Atlantic Charter was the result of a press 
release issued by the two statesmen that set forth their aims for 
a post-war peace. The common principles of the Charter created by 
the United States and Great Britain were! (i) neither country would 
seek any aggrandisement, territorial or otherwise; (2) no terri­
torial changes would occur without the expressed wishes of the 
people involved ; (3) both countries would respect the right of all 
peoples to choose the form of government under which they would live} 
(4) they would endeavor to trade with the whole world for materials 
which axe needed for economic prosperity? (5) they would give the 
fullest collaboration with all nations in the economic field} (6) 
after the destruction of the Nasi philosophy and rule, they hoped 
for an established peace; (7) this peace should allow men to travel 
•foe high seas and oceans freely 1 and (8) all nations must abandon the 
use of fore© and crush the burden of armaments. The Atlantic Charter 
can be called the Fourteen Points of toe Second World War, for it 
also established the post-war goal for peace and security which was 
backed by the heads of the two most powerful nations in the world.
The Charter is also significant in that it planted the seed for the 
establishment of the United Nations,
This action by President Roosevelt was a major step in his 
policy of limited co-belligerency prior to the United States' total 
involvement. The United States was forming a war and post-war policy
6with an active belligerent nation even though America was not 
involved. In essence, the Atlantic Charter was an implied promise 
of future American belligerence. Considering the circumstances, 
this policy was not in accordance with the spirit of the neutrality 
laws of the 19309s. President Roosevelt’s famous “Quarantine Speech” 
in Chicago, 1937, and his 19^1 "Four Freedoms" laid the groundwork 
for the Atlantic Charter. The United States was in a transitional 
state between being a seemingly neutral nation and becoming an 
active belligerent. The United States, by the Atlantic Charter, was 
involved in an Anglo-American proposal designed to exercise leader­
ship in policing the world both during and after the war. America 
accepted the responsibility for the defeat of Germany when Roosevelt 
announced that ” . . .  after the final destruction of Nazi tyranny,
they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations
2the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, , ,
The spirit of the Atlantic Charter is quite evident in later 
conferences involving the United States' role in the war, including 
Yalta, This monumental meeting in the North Atlantic was not destined 
to become a formal treaty, nor a signed document, nor even an official 
state paper. It was an executive agreement issued by President Roose­
velt, and its only legal position was a carefully phrased press release. 
The Atlantic Charter was not the first and not to be the last time
2Samuel Rosenman, ed,, The Public Papers of Address of Franklin
D. Roosevelt (New Yorks Harper and Brothers, 1950jr" P* 3*5»
7President Roosevelt initiated United States foreign policy without 
the 'consent of Congress•
The importance of the Atlantic Charter m s  soon realised in 
another executive agreement made by President Roosevelt, the Declara- 
tion of the United Nations. Two weeks after the Japanese attack on 
Pearl Harbor, Prime Minister Winston Churchill travelled to Washington 
and met with President Roosevelt in conjunction with other c©“belliger­
ents . The result was a document, dated January i, 19^ 2, signed by 
twenty-six nations currently at war with the Axis powers. The 
Declaration of the United Nations was pledged to the principles set 
forth by the Atlantic Charter, and the participants agreed not to 
sign separate peaces, and declared their unity against a common enemy. 
This executive agreement became a binding military alliance.
The next important conference held during the war was the Casa­
blanca Conference. This meeting, like the Atlantic Charter, was held 
solely between the United States and Britain, From January I k  to the 
2k of 19^ 3, Churchill and Roosevelt met with the purpose of discussing 
the opening of the Mediterranean to Allied commerce, thereby saving a 
twelve-thousand-mile trip around the Cape of Good Hope, and regaining 
a foothold on the European Gontinent which would hopefully lead to 
the eventual assault upon the Reich itself. This was against the hopes 
of Stalin, who wanted to establish a second Allied front in Europe to 
relieve the pressure on Russia, The United States and Great Britain 
decided to invade Sicily; but, at the conference, Resident Roosevelt
8mentioned a policy which overshadowed our policy toward the Axis and 
their satellites. This policy was the on© of "unconditional surrender," 
It was not formed by the State Department, but was revealed in a dis­
cussion in the presence of Prime Minister Churchill, The President 
quickly qualified his statement by saying that unconditional surrender 
meant H # # . the^  ending of a philosophy based on the conquest and sub­
jugation of other peoples," not the total destruction of Germany, Japan
3
and Italy. This policy of unconditional surrender turned out to be
one of the important topics of discussion at later conferences,
including Yalta,
Thus, the Casablanca Conference advanced another important step 
in outlining American foreign policy in the realm of the allied opera­
tions during the war# President Roosevelt bound the United States by 
the use of the executive agreement, for he rationalized that this con­
ference contained top secret planning that would lose its effective­
ness if it were made public. Therefore, the agreements made at Casa-
lL
blanea did not go before Congress.
light months after the Casablanca Conference, there was a note­
worthy conference held in Moscow, The Moscow Conference, which ran 
from October 19 to 30, 1943, was a meeting attended by the United 
States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China, President Roosevelt
^Cordell Hull, Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York* Macmillan 
Company, 1948), p. 1570.
4
Samuel Flagg Bends, Diplomatic History of the United States 
(New York? Holt and CompsnyJ^l^STT^P* 9^0.
9m s  certain that World War II would lead to some type of an inter­
national security system directed toward avoiding further world wars. 
The governments present at this conference agreed and stated that 
they "believed in the necessity of the establishment of a general 
international organisation. Thus the idea of a world organization 
which was suggested in the Atlantic Charter continued to be a topic 
of vital concern among the Allies. During the Moscow Conference, 
Stalin was informed that President Roosevelt and Prime Minister 
Churchill had made preparations at the Washington and Quebec con­
ference for a second front in France. Stalin "was so pleased as
to promise that when the European war ended he would enter the
5conflict against Japan.Later, in a meeting between President 
Roosevelt, Brirne Minister Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek at Cairo, 
which was held between November 22 and 26, 19^ 3» the three men 
agreed that the war would continue until Japan had accepted the
9
unconditional surrender and that the territories taken from China 
in and after 189^ would be given back to her. Also at the Cairo 
Conference, they decided that Korea should be free and independent. 
Stalin was not at this meeting because Chiang Kai-shek was there, 
and Stalin felt that his presence might provoke Japan to attack 
Russia, a confrontation which the Soviets were anxious to avoid at 
that time.
5^Thomas A, Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People 
(New York: Apple tcn-Century-Crofis, 19© 57 P. 759.
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Despite the importance of the Atlantic Charter, the Casablanca 
Conference, the Moscow Conference and the Cairo Conference, the next 
conference between the Allied forces was probably the most significant, 
Fes? the first time, President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and 
Marshal Stalin met face to face at the Teheran Conference which was 
held between November 28 and December 1, 1943# Cordell Hull, in 
October of the same year, convinced Stalin that the Soviet leader 
must meet with Churchill and Roosevelt, Stalin suggested the meeting 
take place at Teheran, for he would leave Moscow only if his destina­
tion enabled him to be in direct touch with his General Staff and 
Teheran was held by the Soviet Army, Stalin also had the feeling 
that his armies had done better work than the Allied armies 5 and if 
he had the conference at Teheran, it might elevate his position,^ 
Finally, Churchill end Roosevelt agreed to the Teheran meeting. At 
the Teheran Conference, Roosevelt let Stalin know that he was in dis­
agreement with Churchill about the conduct of the war and the plans
for post-war peace, and Stalin proposed that Roosevelt should take
7the "chair" during the meetings/ A possible reason for Roosevelt’s 
action was that he wanted to hear both sides of the story before he
o
committed himself to the British or the Russians, But, at Teheran,
6Isaac Deutscher- Stalin s A Political Biography (London 1 Oxford 
University'Press, 1949)* P# 503#
7Chester tfilmot and H, S, Commager, "Uas Yalta A Calamity?**, New 
York Times Magazine, August 3» 1952, p. 7.
o
Ibid,a p, 46,
11
Roosevelt found Stalin to be correct, stiff, and solemnly incommuni- 
o
cative* He did try to break through, but only the little stabs at
Churchill amused Stalin6 Roosevelt is quoted as saying, " • • • I
don't know a good Russian from a bad Russian . , , I don’t understand 
IQ
the Russians," * Stalin and Churchill represented polar positions at
the conference, Roosevelt stood between them, although he was closer
to Churchill than to Stalin, Stalin viewed Churchill and Roosevelt
as the representatives of the capitalist classj consequently, he
connected little importance to their professions of democracy. The
two most important facets of the Teheran Conference were the Big
Three’s first meeting and, second, the important decision involving
the Allied assault on Europe, They decided on "overlord,M which
called for Great Britain and the United States to attack Europe on
the French coast rather than through the Balkans, Stalin realized
that with the Allies invading France, Europe would be cut into two
areas of political influence, for while the British and Americans were
assaulting Prance, Russia was to attack the Balkans and the Eastern
front to create a diversion. Thus, Russian troops would clear the
area in the East, resulting in the creation of spheres# It was stated
11that "this was a moment of Stalin’s supreme triumph," It was also
o
'Deutscher, Stalin? A Political Biography, p, 508,
10Francis Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew (New York: Viking Press,
1966), p. 72.
Deutscher, Stalin» A Folltleal Biography, p. 508.
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reported that only Stalin and Churchill were aware of its implica­
tions* Eastern Europe was to he Russia's zone of influence. The 
question of Hussia's entry into the Pacific Wax was again discussed 
at Teheran. Roosevelt proposed that American heavy bombers be based 
north of Vladivostok and that the United States have access to Soviet 
ports in the East for the possible deployment of naval forces, Roose­
velt also requested the immediate exchange of military intelligence 
concerning the Japanese. Stalin agreed that these proposals should 
be studied with some concern and that he would not interfere with 
the sovereignty of China over Manchuria and the recognition of the 
status quo in Outer Mongolia. Stalin suggested theinternationaliza­
tion of the Port of Dairen, not a lease. These issues later became 
the basis for the discussions at Yalta regarding the Soviet entry 
into the Japanese Wax,
The stage for the Yalta Conference was rapidly being set.
The Teheran Conference, not a treaty but another important executive 
agreement, was to have the impact of an international treaty.
The final discussion of the plans for a world organization 
prior to the Yalta Conference was held at Dumbarton Oaks. Repre­
sentatives of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union 
met from August 21 to October 7 of 19^. They decided on the idea 
and purposes which later were reflected in the United Nations* 
organization. The diplomats from the three major powers decided 
that there should be a General Assembly, Security Council and other
13
numerous instrumentalities. The Soviet representative, Andrei 
Gromyko, proposed that all of the sixteen Soviet Republics have 
seats in the General Assembly and that the Great Powers should 
have the veto power in the Security Council, The basic obligations 
and responsibilities were decided upon which would have to be 
assumed by the participating states if it were to be an effective 
organization. The matters of voting procedure in the Security 
Council and the number of votes in the General Assembly were left 
open for later conferences.
The time between the Dumbarton Oaks Conference and the Yalta 
Conference is an extremely important issue. The war was of course 
advanced, but Great Britain and the Soviet Union made, some impor­
tant agreements which would later affect the Yalta discussions.
In June of 19^, the British suggested that Rumania and Bulgaria 
be treated as part of the Russian zone and that Britain take Greece.
This was done because Churchill realized his defeat at the Teheran
12Conference, and he wanted to keep the Russians out of Greece,
This was confirmed in October of 19^ when Eden came to Moscow,
The Conference decided that between seventy-five and eighty per cent 
of Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania would be Russian while the British 
would carry twenty to thirty per cent. Churchill and Stalin agreed
13that the Soviets and British would split fifty-fifty in Yugoslavia, 
Prime Minister Churchill contacted President Roosevelt about
~'2Ibid.. p. 515. 13roid.. p. 516.
th© agreements? and he wanted Harriraan, if agreeable to Churchill 
and Stalin, to attend the meetings in order to report back to him.
This was approved, Roosevelt also suggested that their plan for the 
Balkans should be tested on a three-month trial and that care should 
be taken to snake it clear that no post-war spheres of influence were
i h
being established. Roosevelt did not inform the Department of 
State about this situation until June 12, 19 4^; and, thus, the 
actions had already been partly carried out.
Stalin had established two principles to which he tried to get 
the Allies to agree. The first was that he was free to intervene 
against the pro-Nazi and Fascist groups and to establish a democratic 
order in the countries neighboring the Soviet Union. The second was 
that the governments of these countries should be friendly to the 
Soviets. These two principles came into play for the first time 
regarding Poland.
The Teheran Documents had been kept secret, but on January 22, 
19^ 4, Prime Minister Churchill tried to persuade Premier Mikolajczyk 
and Foreign Minister Romer to agree on five points. The first one 
was that the Polish government (in London) was to accept the so-called 
Curzon Line as a basis far negotiations with the Soviet government. 
They were to have a final settlement of the eastern frontier to be 
linked with the grant of East Prussia to Poland along with Danzig and 
Upper Silesia to the Oder River. All the Poles left on the Soviet
^Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, p. 1^ 55*
15
side of Poland’s eastern frontier were to have the right to return 
to Poland, and all the German population within the new Polish 
borders was to be removed# These enumerated solutions were to 
receive the approved and guarantee of the three principal United 
Nations countries. The Soviet radio broadcast appeals for the 
underground in Warsaw to revolt as the Red Armies moved closer.
General Bor was convinced of the accuracy of the broadcast when 
he learned that Premier Mikolajczyk of the London exile government 
arrived in Moscow, and under his leadership, the underground troops 
revolted at 5*00 p, m. on August i, 194^ , Mikolajczyk was forced 
to realize that the London government was going to lose, and the 
National Committee of Liberation, as well as fifty per cent of the 
cabinet pests, would be from the Lublin government, and the eastern 
frontier of Poland would have to be approximately the Curzon Line,
He was assured on August 9» 1944, by Stalin that the Soviets would 
send military aid to General Bor*s forces in Warsaw, This, however, 
was never done. The Soviet government, with the help of Bole slaw 
Bierut, a known communist, Osobka-Morawski, the Chairman of the 
Soviet-created Committee of National Liberation, and Marshal Rola- 
Zymierski, who was acting on orders from Moscow, set up the Lublin 
Committee. This committee was to discredi the Polish government in 
London, fcr now that the Polish Home Army had been broken by the Nazis,
15Arthur Lane, I Saw Poland Betrayed (Bostons Western Islands,
19*8). P. 4?.
16
there was no remaining leadership to dispute the authority of the 
Lublin group*
On December 18, 19^> Secretary of State Edward Stettinius 
stated that the United States government stood for a free and inde­
pendent Poland, but the United States would not raise any objection 
to the delineation of Poland’s frontiers before the ending of hos­
tilities, if a mutual agreement were reached by the United Nations 
(which was not yet a functioning body), Stettinius continued to say 
that if, as a result of such an agreement, the Polish government and 
people should favor the transfer of national groups, the United States 
would assist Poland in the transfers. This was, of course, subject to 
legislative authority in regard to aiding any such transfer. But, on 
December 31» 19^ *, "the Lublin Committee officially announced itself 
as the Provisional Government of Poland, and on January 1, 19^ 5» 
Stettinius stated that "this government /the United States/ Continues
to maintain formal diplomatic relations with the Polish Government-in- 
17exile in London," On January 5, Stalin recognized the Lublin govern­
ment as the Provisional Government of Poland. Churchill replied that 
he was hampered in his protest by the fact that he had made agreements 
with the Soviets,
In December of 19^, Stalin told Aver ell Harr i man that the 
Soviets* interest in the East centered around the re-establishment of 
their territories as they had existed before the Russo-Japanese War of
ibid.. p. 53. 17ibia.. p . 75.
17
1905. The property included the lower half of the island Sakhalin, 
the Kuril.© Islands, the lease ports of Dairen and Port Arthur, and 
those railroads in Manchuria which were built by Russians under con­
tract with the Chinese government, specifically the Chinese Eastern 
Railway, a direct line from the Trans-Siberian Railroad through to
Vladivoslok and the South Manchurian Railroad making the connection
IS
to Dairen, But, before this, during the Moscow Conference in 19**3>
Stalin told Cordell Hull that when Germany was defeated, the Soviets
would join in defeating Japan, Hull states that ’’the Marshal's
statement of his decision was forthright. He made it emphatically,
19it was entirely unsolicited and he asked nothing in return," Hull 
felt that this was so important he sent the message back to President 
Roosevelt, half in Army code and the other half in Navy code, Stalin 
was changing his mind, and this alteration was to play a big part in 
the Yalta Conference, The last meeting of the Big Three had been at 
Teheran more than a year earlier. Many things had changed; and, with 
the end of the war approaching, Allied leaders needed to plan for 
world peace after the defeat of Germany and Japan, Problems like the 
Polish question had to be settled. The first suggestion for another 
meeting was made by President Roosevelt in a letter to Marshal Stalin 
dated July 17» 19^» and marked Top Secret, Priority, The letter reads
18William A, Karrinan, "Our Wartime Relations with the Soviet 
Union and the Agreements Reached at Yalta," U, S. Department of State 
Bulletin, XX¥. September 3. 1951» P* 372.
197Hull, Memoirs of Cordell Hull, p. 1310,
18
Tilings are moving so fast and so success­
fully that I feel there should be a meeting 
between you and Mr. Churchill and me in the 
reasonably near future. The Prime Minister 
is in hearty accord with this thought. I am 
now on a trip in the far West and must be in 
Washington for several weeks on my return.
It would, therefore, be best forme to have a 
meeting between the tenth and fifteenth of 
September. The most central point for you 
and me would be the north of Scotland. I 
could go by ship or by plane. Your Army is
doing so magnificently that the hop would be
i —n mi ii i iVrm i ur.ii i mu r~ili      -mi —T - ■inwm m im m * —— i n
much shorter to Scotland than the one taken 
by Molotov two years ago. I hope you can let 
me have your thoughts* Secrecy and security 
can be maintained either aboard ship or on 
shore. /The underlined was admitted before 
delivery to StalinJ fiSLevelt20
In a letter dated September Zk9 19^ 4, from Ambassador Harriman 
to the President, It was reported that Stalin was afraid his doctors 
would not let him travel. Harriman also reported that it had taken 
Stalin two weeks to recover from an ear attack he had suffered during
his flight from Teheran, andJ&s recent illness had been due to a
recent trip to the Russian front. In conclusion, Harriman stated,
”1 am satisfied that Stalin is anxious to meet you but he is defi-
21 initely worried about his health, ” later, Stalin suggested in a 
letter to Roosevelt that he would like to meet at the end of November 
in the Black Sea axea, and he stated that Churchill agreed. Roosevelt 
responded to Churchill on October 22 that the Black Sea idea depended
20U, S. Department of State, Conference at Malta and Yalta 
(Washington, D, C.s Government Printing Office, i955j» P* 3.
21Ibid,, p. 5.
19
on the ability to get-through the Dardanelles safely, for he wished 
to travel by ship, Roosevelt than suggested Cyprus or Athens for 
the site of the conference, Churchill liked this idea and replied 
that he would check into it, but Stalin still wanted acceptance of
S.
the Black Sea, Roosevelt stated that Dr, Me Intire said there were 
bad health conditions in the Black Sea area. In another letter to 
Churchill, dated the 14th of November, Roosevelt said that the con­
ference would have more meaning if it were held after the inaugura­
tion, Since the meeting place was still undecided upon, Roosevelt 
suggested that the end of January or the first of February of 19^5 
would be a better time for the conference. He also suggested 
Jerusalem or Alexandria for the place because his advisors told
him they did not want to risk a "capital" ship through the straits,
22for it would take too much guarding.
After the elections, Roosevelt was suffering from physical 
and mental strain accompanied by a loss of appetite. He was down 
to 170 pounds, and deepening lines were already appearing on his 
face. But, Stalin still refused to go to the Mediterranean Sea 
because of his doctor's advice and the fact that he wanted to be 
able, as at Teheran, to b© in close contact with the Soviet Army,
On December 30, 19^, President Roosevelt agreed to go to Yalta, 
This was followed a day later by Churchill's agreement.
Before discussing the Malta and Yalta Conferences, it is
^Ibld. - p. 15.
20
necessary to mention the military and political situation at the 
time of the conferences as well as the aims and purposes the leaders 
held, While President Roosevelt was meeting with Prime Minister 
Churchill and Marshal Stalin in the Crimea, American and British 
troops had just recovered the ground lost in the Battle of the 
Bulge, the Allies had not yet reached the Rhine, and the advance 
in Italy had hogged down. Having swept through most of Poland and 
East Prussia, Soviet troops had reached some points on Germany's 
Oder River, Most of Hungary had been captured, and the Yugoslav 
Partisans had captured Belgrade In November, 19^# By the time 
of the Yalta Conference, Poland and all of Eastern Europe had fallen 
to the Soviet troops. United States farces were locked in a bloody 
battle on Iwo Jima and had not yet taken Okinawa, Some critics 
feel that the United States was in no position to argue at Yalta; 
and, if it had used the Balkan strategy that Churchill suggested, 
rather than the English Channel for a major offensive, -the Russians 
would have been contained. But in view of the military situation at 
that time, American military officials deemed this idea too expen­
sive and the Balkan area too difficult a terrain for a major Western 
offensive. Moreover, the United States could not have moved fast
enough to be victorious before October of 19^ when the Russians 
23reached Warsaw, Thus, when one takes the time to discover the 
23•^ Rudolph Winnacker, 1 Yalta* Another Munich,” Virginia Quarterly 
Review, XXIV, Autumn, 19^, p. 53^ •
21
military and political conditions in the early months of 19^5t he can 
realize the tremendous difficulties involved in a policy of opposition 
to the Soviet Union at that time. The objectives of World War II were 
unconditional surrender of the Axis powers and the establishment of a 
world order of cooperation which was to be based on the principles set 
forth in the Atlantic Charter, The United States needed the help of 
Russia to end the war with Germany and to set up a successful world 
organisation. Thus, the United States' aims at the Yalta Conference 
were to smooth over the problems of Dumbarton Oaks and to establish 
the United Nations, It was also necessary to settle the future 
strategy in Europe and the Ear East regarding the invasion of Germany 
and the Soviet Union's entry into the war with Japan, Pear of 
impairing Allied unity was still another problem facing the Big 
Three, The United States Ambassador to Russia, William A, Harriman, 
summed up the Allied attitude toward Russia by stating*
The primary objective of the American and 
British Governments in our relations with the 
Soviet Union during the war was to keep the 
Soviet Army as an effective fighting force 
against Hitler, It was also our objective to 
encourage the Soviet Union to join in the war 
against Japan at the earliest possible date.2^
The last objective regarding the Soviet entry into the Japanese
war was needed soon enough to save American lives.
President Roosevelt felt that his purpose at Yalta was again to
bring Germany to defeat at the earliest date, conquer Japan, and build
Harriman, "Our Wartime Relations with the Soviet Union," p. 3?2,
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the foundations for the world peace organization. The President
trusted Stalin and believed that the wishes of the Russian and
American peoples were compatiblej thus, he was confident of winning
25the Soviets1 lasting cooperation at Yalta,. The President and his 
advisors Hull and Hopkins felt that diplomacy based on friendship
26would bring a sympathetic response from the Soviet representatives,
Roosevelt believed that his role at Yalta should be that of a raedi-
27atcr between Churchill and Stalin,
Although pertinent State Department reports and data were on
board the ship during the voyage to Yalta, it is reported that the
28President preferred to rest rather than study these documents.
Among these United States plans were those made between November of 
19^ and January of 19^5 concerning Central-Eastern Europe, On Janu­
ary 18, 19^5, just before Roosevelt left far Malta, Secretary Stetti­
nius presented the President with the black book entitled, Briefing 
29Papers, The Briefing Papers contained most of the material needed 
for the imminent discussions in the Crimea,
^Chester Wilmot, Struggle For Europe (New Yorks Harper, 1952),
P. 639.
26Ibld.. -p. 639.
27William H, McNeill, America, Britain and Russia (London: Royal
Institute of International Affairs, 1953)# P."357.
og
^ James F, Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper, 19^ 7), p. 23.
29John Snell, The Meaning of Yalta (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 19557, P» 99. See Appendix B for an example.
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Contained in this State Department document were problems and 
suggested alternatives, for guiding President Roosevelt’s strategy at 
Yalta, Many delicate subjects were dealt with, particularly a dis­
cussion of the Soviet objectives in Eastern Europe, The State Depart­
ment suggested the establishment of an "Emergency High Commission for
Liberated Europe” that, with the support of the’Big Four,” would help
30form popular governments in liberated Eastern Europe, The prin­
ciples mentioned in the Atlantic Charter had been formulated in the 
"Declaration of Liberated Europe” and would be used in this effort.
Other topics dealt with in the Briefing Papers included the unifica­
tion of China, spheres of influence in Europe, loans to the Soviet 
Union, post-war status of Korea, and Soviet participation in the war 
against Japan with consideration of possible Soviet support of the 
Chinese Communists,
Marshal Stalin entered the Yalta Conference with a sense of 
superiority of Russia’s contribution toward the approaching victory 
over Germany, He had very definite aims as to the economic recon­
struction of Russia and to the future security of Soviet territory 
by establishing friendly and cooperative governments between Germany 
and the Soviet Union, For twice, in a relatively short time, bel- 
ligerant nations had used the Polish Corridor as a road to Russia,
In addition, Stalin came to bargain for the price of Russia’s entry 
into the Japanese &ar, Stalin believed he had the advantage because
30
U. S. Department of State, Conferences at Malta-.and. Yalta, p, 97,
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of tbs Soviet Armies* campaigns? in fact, at the beginning of the
conference, Russian troops were just fifty miles from Berlin, On
the other hand, Prime Minister Churchill was apprehensive when he
arrived at the conference, for he remembered what had happened at the
31Teheran C onfeocene e,
With his purposes and objectives in mind, President Roosevelt 
left Washington by a special train on January 22, 1945* On the 23rd 
he sailed from an East coast port on the Quincy, an American naval 
cruiser which arrived at Malta on February 2. The President was met 
by Secretary Stettinius, Harry Hopkins, William A, Harriman and Win­
ston Churchill, While at Malta, Churchill and Roosevelt met for a 
discussion before Yalta, Churchill hoped to reach an agreement with 
President Roosevelt that they could propose to Stalin, but Roosevelt 
wanted to refrain from making any agreements so that Stalin would not 
feel he was dealing with any sort of an Anglo-American delegation, 
Churchill relates that "no hard and fast agreements were made on any 
of the political issues. Those naturally were to form the subject
of the triple conference and they were carefully kept open for the 
32full meeting. Even though Roosevelt had been warned by Harriman 
on January 10, 1945, of the Soviets* policy in Eastern Europe of 
using secret police, local communist parties and troops to assure
31Winston Churchill, Closing the Ring (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Co,, 1951 )»■ PP. 405-407.
32Congressional Record, ?9th Congress, 1st Sess,, p. A917, 1945.
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the establishment of favorable governments, Roosevelt was less sus-
33picious of the Soviets* post-war intentions than was Churchill*
At dawn, the planes left the Malta airfield in ten-minute intervals, 
with the Saki airfield as their destination. President Roosevelt 
flew in the Sacred Cow, the airplane especially built for him which 
included an elevator for his convenience. After the arrival at Saki, 
the party motored over the mountainous terrain to Yalta. The five- 
hour trip took them through the devastated areas from which the 
Germans had been driven. The road was guarded by Soviet soldiers, 
some of whom were women, who were well armed.
President Roosevelt stayed at Livadia Palace which had been 
a summer palace for the Czar. Under the direction of Dr, Me In tire, 
the President’s room and the palace were cleaned with a ten per cent 
solution of D,D,Te in kerosene. The beds, bedding, and rugs were 
given three sprayings and then dusted with D.D.T. There were also 
daily inspections of the quarters to make sure they were clean. 
Lieutenant Commander George Fox gave President Roosevelt an alcohol 
rub and light massage before bed every night, Churchill and the 
principal members of the British delegation had the Vorontsov Villa 
which was about five miles from the Livadia Palace, Stalin and 
Molotov stayed at the Yusupov Palace. The remainder of the United
33
U, S, Department of State, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 
pp. 64-66,
34 /Ross Mclntire, Whitehon.se Physician [New York: G. P, Put­
nam's Sons, 1946), pp. 215-20,
26
States and British delegations stayed in two rest houses about
twenty minutes away. The meetings between Roosevelt, Churchill
and Stalin were held on the ground floor of the Livadia Palace for
the convenience of the President,
The United States* cast at the Yalta Conference included
President Roosevelt; Secretary of State Edward Stettiniusj Fleet
Admiral William Leahy, who was the United States Navy Chief of
Staff to the President} Harry Hopkins, Special Assistant to the
President; Justice James Byrnes, who was the Director of the Office
of Wax Mobilisation and Reconversion} General of the Army George C,
Marshall, who was the United States Army Chief of Staff} Fleet
Admiral Ernest King, Chief of Naval Operations and Commander-in-
chief of the United States Fleet} Lt, General Brehon Somervell,
Commanding General Army Service Forces} Vice Admiral Emory Land,
War Shipping Administration} Major General Laurence Kuter, Staff
of the Commanding General} William Harriman, Ambassador to the
Soviet Union} H. Freeman Matthews, Director of European Affairs,
State Department} Alger Hiss, Deputy Director, Office of Special
Political Affairs, Department of State} and Charles E. Bohlen,
Assistant to the Secretary of State; together with political,
35military, and technical advisors.
Representing the United Kingdom were Prime Minister Churchill; 
Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Lord Leathers,
35^Congressional Record, 79th Cong,, 1st Sess,, p, 1025.
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Minister of War Transport! Sir A, Clark Kerr, Ambassador at Moscowj 
Sir Alexander C&dogan, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs? Sir Edward Bridges, Secretary of the War Cabinet? Field Mar­
shal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff; Marshal 
of. the Royal Air Force Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff; 
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, First Sea Lord; General 
Sir Hastings Is may, Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defense; 
together with Field Marshal Alexander, Supreme Allied Commander, 
Mediterranean theatre; and Field Marshal Wilson, head of tbs British 
Joint Staff Mission at Washington, together with military and diplo- 
matic advisors.
Those representing the Soviet Union were Marshal J. V. Stalin, 
Chairman of the Council of Peoples Commissars of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics? V. M. Molotov, Peoples Commissar for Foreign 
Affairs of the U.S.S.R.; Admiral Nicholai Kuznetsov, Peoples Commis­
sar for the Navy; Army General Aleksei Antonov, Deputy Chief of the 
General Staff of the Red Army? Andrei Vyshinski, Deputy Peoples 
Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.; Ivan Maiski, Deputy 
Peoples Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R; Marshal of
Aviation Sergei Khydyakov; Fedor Gusev, Ambassador in Great Britain;
37and Andrei Gromyko, Ambassador to the United States.
The French government was not invited to attend the Conference.
3 Ibid.. 1025.
37Congressional Record. 79th Cong,, 1st Sess,, p* 1025.
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Harry Hopkins, who was in France before the Conference, gave the 
French the feeling that no major decisions would be made behind 
de Gaulle's back* De Gaulle stated that the Big Three's decisions 
would not be binding on the French until he had had the opportunity 
to discuss them with the major Allies on an equal basis and had 
accepted them* The French press gave the opinion that it was 
President Roosevelt who did not want de Gaulle because of Roose­
velt's ” , . . belief that the Big Three would have trouble enoi^ jh 
on their hands without adding a man who, as the French put it, is
oo
not noted for 'putting oil in the machinery' of diplomacy,"
Secretary Stettinius reported that the President would not recog­
nize de Gaulle until it could be proved ihat he was really supported 
by the French people themselves, De Gaulle's personal reaction was 
that he was offended, but not surprised, for he realized France had
not reached her role as a world power yet.
There was no single official record of the proceedings nor was 
there any stenotypist recording every word, but each delegation kept 
its own notes. Sir Edward Bridges took the notes for the British 
and Charles Bohlen for the United States, The conference began 
February 19 5^* At 10:30 a, m,, President Roosevelt met with his
advisors, followed by a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The
New York Times, February 11, 19^ 5*
39 /Edward Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians (New York:
Doubleday, 19^ 9)» P. 103.
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United States' wanted better communication among the Allies, more 
coordination and exchange of information between General Eisenhower, 
Field Marshal Alexander, and the Soviet General Staff. They also 
talked of the United Nations, Germany, Poland, the control commis­
sions for Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. The Joint Chiefs decided 
to adopt the United States* proposal for the voting formula and to 
call for a United Nations Conference. They also decided to adopt 
the Emergency European High Commission to function from the end of 
the war until the creation of the United Nations, In regard to the 
treatment of Germany, the Joint Chiefs agreed on the control of the 
administrative details for the zones of occupation, and Germany*s 
boundaries. They opposed the indiscriminate mass exchange of 
minorities with neighboring states, and the abolition of German 
self ^sufficiency was agreed upon. Discussions regarding Poland 
resulted in the acceptance of her boundaries as being the Curzon 
Line in the North and South and the Eastern line of Lwow Province, 
The transfer of German territory was to be limited to East Prussia 
(except Koenigsherg going to Russia), a small coastal salient of 
Pomerania and Upper Silesia, They also agreed on the formation of 
new representative governments pledged to free elections with the 
inclusion of the Mikolajczky government in Poland. With regard to 
the Allied Control Commission in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, the 
Allied diplomats suggested that the United States* representative 
be assured of his freedom of movement and that there would be
30
consultation before decisions were made* On the Iran question, the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested that the President should seek Soviet 
agreement on not pressing for oil concessions until the end of hos­
tilities and urged the withdrawal of the Allied troops* In China, 
the Joint Chiefs suggested that Roosevelt seek Soviet-British support
for United States efforts to bring about a Kuomintang-Communist 
40agreement* This was the advice for the Resident’s use in future 
discussions in the Yalta agenda.
When Resident Roosevelt and Marshal Stalin met at 4:00 p. m., 
Charles Bohlen, Mr, Molotov and Mr, Pavlov were also in attendance.
The informal discussion started with Roosevelt’s kidding Stalin about 
a bet he made on whether United States troops would capture Manila 
before the Soviets occupied Berlin, Stalin stated that he had better 
bet on the United States, They then got down to more serious matters, 
Stalin agreed with the idea of establishing better communications 
among the Allied troops, Roosevelt then asked how he had gotten along 
with de Gaulle, and Stalin gave the impression that he did not think 
too much of him or of the French war effort, Stalin then asked the 
President’s opinion of giving the French a zone in Germany. Roosevelt 
replied that it was a good idea and that they ought to do it out of 
kindness, With this remark, Molotov stated that that would be the 
only reason for giving the French a zone,
40State Department, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, p, 573*
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At 5*00 p. ia,, the first plenary meeting between the Big Three 
was held in the Livadia Palace. This initial discussion concerned 
basically military matters, Stalin suggested that President Roose­
velt take the "chair” as he had done at Teheran? when this was done, 
General Antonov, Chief of the Russian General Staff, began with a 
circumstantial and detailed account of the progress of the recent 
Russian offensive in Poland, General Marshal followed with a descrip­
tion of the Battle of the Bulge and of the Anglo-American plans for 
resuming the offensive. Admiral Cunningham concluded with some
remarks about the anticipated resumption of the German U-Boat war- 
41fare. The Military Staffs would meet the following day at noon,
and the Big Three would meet at 4;00 p, m, to discuss the political
treatment of Germany,
That evening there was a dinner at 8*30 p. m. in the Livadia
Palace at which Stalin, Roosevelt, Churchill, and some of their chief
advisors were present. The discussion led to the Great Powers*
responsibility to the lesser powers, Vishinsky was reported as
stating that "Russia will never agree to the right of the small
42powers to judge an act of the Great Powers," This viewpoint is 
important to note, for the topic of discussion for this tripartite 
dinner was the voice of the smaller powers in a post-war peace organ­
isation,
41
McNeill, America, Britain and Russia, p. 542,
42Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians, p. 112,
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On the second day of the conference, February 5? the discus­
sions attacked the basic problems to be solved at Yalta, These 
topics fell into the categories of the United Nations, the questions 
involving Europe (especially Germany and Poland), and the Far East,
The day started with another Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting at 
10100 a, m. After the minutes of the previous meeting were approved, 
the Chiefs of Staff talked about the British idea of not returning to 
Malta after the conference, the allocation of the zones of occupation 
in Germany, and the Russian participation in the war against Japan, 
They wanted to have Marshal Stalin's answers to two questions. First, 
did he need to keep the supply line across the Pacific to Eastern 
Siberia open, and second, would he assure the United States' being 
granted air bases in Soviet territory? This meeting was followed by 
the first Tripartite Military Meeting as proposed at the end of the 
first plenary meeting the day before. Beginning at 12i00 noon in the 
lusupov Palace, they talked about the coordination of the offensive 
operations of the Allies, the movement of German forces from Norway, 
the liaison arrangements, naval operations in support of the land 
offensive, the possible date for the end of the war, hopefully July 1, 
The final discussion involved their future business. At the next 
meeting, they wished to talk over the coordination of air operations, 
shuttle bombing, and the war in the Far East, A luncheon meeting of 
the Foreign Ministers followed at 1*30 in the Yusupov Palace, The sub­
jects, after the toasts, included treatment of Germany along with the
33
economic matters relative to Germany, The Foreign Ministers decided 
that the conference should be named the Crimea Conference,
At 2*30? President Roosevelt held a meeting with certain men in 
his advisory staff, among whom were Kopkins, Matthews and Bohlen. At 
this time, the President was informed of. the happenings during the 
morning Foreign Ministers® meeting.
The second plenary meeting started at 4*00 p. m, in the Livadia 
Palace, President Roosevelt opened the meeting by stating that he 
wished to talk about the future treatment of Germany and by distri­
buting a map showing the zones "agreed upon by the European Advisory
43Commission but not yet accepted by the three governments, Stalin 
then stated that he would like to include in the discussion the topic
a
of partitioning Germany, for there were no agreements made at either 
Teheran or at Moscow, For example, if the Big Three were to establish 
a government in Germany, would each section have its own government? 
Stalin felt there was a need to work out definite terms of the uncon­
ditional surrender and the types of reparations and their amounts, 
Churchill stated that he felt the topic of German partitioning was 
too complicated to solve at Yalta, but he stated that his mind could 
be changed, Churchill went on to state that they had agreed that the 
German territory conquered by the Soviet Army would form part of the 
Polish agreement, but he Wondered whether the Ruhr and the Saar should 
be under the French, made independent, or be controlled by a world
43State Department, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp, 591-611,
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organization for an extended period. He felt that these questions 
required careful study, but he had not formed any set plans on the 
subject. Churchill further suggested that the Big Three should set 
up a body to investigate these problems and report their findings 
before any decision was made, President Roosevelt suggested that 
they agree that Germany should be dismembered, end charge the Foreign 
Ministers with the task of working out the details. The Foreign Mini­
sters were to add to the surrender terms a clause stating that Germany 
was to be dismembered by the best method. There had been some debate 
about putting in the dismemberment terms and whether or not to include 
the details in the surrender terms. Thus, it was referred to the 
Foreign Ministers to decide and then report their findings. The next 
topic which was discussed was that of giving the French a zone of 
occupation in Germany, Churchill wanted the French to have a zone 
which would come from the area granted to the British and Americans, 
and he thought that the French should also have a role in the control 
machinery, particularly since the British might need help in maintain­
ing their zone. When Stalin asked President Roosevelt how long United 
States troops could occupy Germany, Roosevelt replied*
I can get the people and Congress to cooperate 
fully for peace but not to keep an army in 
Europe for a long time. Two years would be 
the limit.^
!
Stalin still did not want the French to have a zone, contending 
44Stettinius* Roosevelt and the Russians, p. 127.
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that they had contributed very little to the defeat of Germany, Chur­
chill countered that the French must have a zone, for they were Germany’s 
most important neighbor. The Big Three finally decided that the French 
should get a zone and that they would let the Foreign Ministers decide 
the part France was to play in the administration of occupied Germany,
€
Deputy Commissar Maisky then presented the Soviet plan for German 
reparations. He suggested that the Allies remove from the German 
national wealth all plants, machine tools, and rolling stock, to be 
completed within two years after the war, Germany would also make 
annual payments over a period of ten years, thus restoring the Russian 
economy and establishing the security of Europe, The Deputy Commissar 
felt it necessary to cut down the German heavy industry by eighty per 
cent. He stated that the priority for nations receiving the repara­
tions would be based on the proportional contribution that each nation 
had made to winning the war and its loss of material. The Soviets 
wanted no less than ten billion dollars in reparations, Maisky con­
cluded by suggesting that a reparations committee from the three govem-
45raents meet in Moscow to work out the details. President Roosevelt 
told the conference that the American people wanted the Germans to live, 
but not with a higher standard of living than other states, for 
instance, the Soviet Union, He would support the idea of establishing 
a reparations committee as suggested, and he thought that this committee 
should use a twenty billion total with half going to the Soviet Union as
45^Department of State, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp, 620-21.
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46a base for discussion. Churchill felt Maisky*s proposal was exces­
sive because they would never get that much money out of a defeated
4*7nation, and he said that he could not picture a starving Germany, '
It was then agreed that the suggestion for a reparations committee be 
turned over to the Foreign Ministers, who would then report back. The 
Big Three set a meeting time for the next day and then adjourned.
The third day of the conference, February 6, began with the 
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at iOiOO a, m. at the Vor­
ontsov Villa, After the approval of the minutes, they discussed the 
levels of supply of petroleua products in the United Kingdom and In 
Northwest Europe, Other topics included the probable date for the 
end of the war against Germany, the provision of landing tracked 
vehicles for the Mediterranean, and the allocation of zones of occu­
pation in Germany. Liaisons with the Soviet High Command talked about 
the Anglo-American strategic bombing in Eastern Europe. They decided 
to hold their next meeting at 10:00 a, m,, Thursday the 8th, to com­
plete any outstanding items on the agenda. This meeting was followed 
by the second Tripartite Military Meeting, held at noon in the Yusupov 
Palace, Field Marshal Brooke presided, and the topics for discussion 
included the bomb line and liaison arrangements, the coordination of 
offensive operations, the exchange of information regarding river 
crossing techniques and equipment, the bases for the United States
46Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, pp. 28-29.
Ibid.. p. 2?.
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strategic -bomber-farces in the Vienna-Bu&apest area, provisions of
the Soviet airfields for damaged British night aircraft, enemy 
intelligence, the Pacific operations, very long-range bomber opera­
tions against Japan, operations in Burma and China, In addition, the
48Tripartite meeting settled the question of their future business.
Also at noon there was a meeting of the Foreign Ministers at
Livadia Palace, The first business was to issue a press release,
approved by Eden, Molotov and Stettinius, which read*
The President of the United States of America, 
the Premier of the Soviet Union and the Prime 
Minister of Great Britain, accompanied by their 
Chiefs of Staff, the three Foreign Secretaries 
and other advisors are now meeting in the Black 
.Sea area.
Their purpose is to concert plans far com­
pleting the defeat of the common enemy and for 
building, with the Allies, firm foundations for 
a lasting peace. Meetings are proceeding con­
tinuously.
The Conference began with military discussions.
The present situation on all the European fronts 
has been reviewed and the fullest information far 
joint military operations in the final phase of the 
war against Nazi Germany, The military staffs of 
the three governments are now engaged in working 
out jointly the detailed plans.
Discussions of problems involved in establishing 
a secure peace have also begun. These discussions 
will cover joint plans for the occupation and con­
trol of Germany, the political and economic problems 
of liberated Europe and proposals far the earliest 
possible establishment of a permanent international 
organization to maintain peace.
A communique will be Issued at the conclusion 
of the Conference,**9
48Department of State, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp. 634-54, 
^%ew York Times, February 8, 1945#
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There was a luncheon at Is00 p, m, between Churchill and Roose­
velt, Hopkins, Byrnes, Harriman and Cadogan also attended. The 
luncheon lasted until 3*00, and the third plenary meeting started 
at 4tQ0, This meeting began with the reading of the voting formula 
by Secretary Stettinius,
It was agreed at Dumbarton Oaks that certain 
matters would remain under consideration for the 
future settlement. Of these, the principal one 
was that of the voting procedure to be followed 
in the Security Council,
At Dumbarton Oaks, the three delegations 
thoroughly explored the whole question. Since 
that time the matter has received continuing 
intensive study by each of the three governments.
On December 5* 1944, the President sent to 
Marshal Stalin and to Prime Minister Churchill 
a proposal that this matter be settled by making 
Section C, Chapter VII of the Dumbarton Oaks 
proposals read substantially as followst 
C, Voting
1. Each member of the Security Council 
should have one vote,
2. Decisions of the Security Council on 
procedural matters should be made by an 
affirmative vote of seven members,
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all 
matters should be made by an affirmative 
vote of seven members including the con­
curring votes of the permanent members, 
provided that, in decisions under Chapter 
VIII, Section A and under the second sen­
tence of Paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII,
Section C, a party to a dispute should 
abstain from voting,50
Stettinius went on to give an analysis of this proposal.
We believe that our proposal is entirely 
consistent with the special responsibilities of 
the Great Powers fcr the preservation of the
50Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians, p, 140,
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peace of the world* In this respect our 
proposal calls for unqualified unanimity of 
the permanent members of the Council on all 
major decisions relating to the preservation 
of peaceg including all economic and military 
enforcement measures*
At the same time our proposal recognizes 
the desirability of the permanent members frankly 
stating that th© peaceful adjustment of any con­
troversy which may arise is a matter of general 
world interest In which any sovereign member 
state involved should have a right to present 
its case.
We believe that unless this freedom of 
discussion in the Council is permitted, the 
establishment of the World Organisation which 
we all so earnestly desire in order to save th© 
world from the tragedy of suiother war would be 
seriously jeopardized. Without full and free 
discussion in the Council, the Organization even 
if it could be established, would be vastly 
different from the one we have contemplated*
The paper which we have placed before the 
other two delegations sets forth the text of 
the provisions which I have read and lists 
specifically those decisions of the Council 
which, under our proposals, would require 
unqualified unanimity, and, separately, those 
matters in the area in which any party to a 
dispute would abstain from casting a vote,51
Secretary Stettinius explained that there was a necessity 
far unanimity between the permanent members in order to preserve 
the peace and there should be provisions for a fair hearing for all 
the members of the organization, both large and small. He went on 
to state that the admission of new members, the suspension of a 
member, expulsion of a member and the elections of the Secretary 
General would require all the affirmative votes in the Security Council
Ltf)
along with the votes of the General Assembly, It was also suggested
that removal of threats to the peace and suppression of breaches of
peace should be subject to a series of questions* whether or not the
• .
parties to a dispute can settle it on their own with the recommenda­
tion of the Security Council, what actions by a nation would consti­
tute a threat to the peace or a breach of it, and what measures should 
be taken by the Security Council to restore and maintain the peace 
and in what manner these actions should be carried out, and lastly, 
whether a regional agency should be authorised to take measures of 
enforcement. The Security Council must also have seven affirmative 
votes for the approval of agreements for the provisions having armed 
forces representing the World Organization, the formulation of plans 
for a system of regulation of armaments, and the determination of
whether a nation and the activities of a regional agency are con-
52sistent with the principles of the organization,- Stettinius finally 
concluded by stating that the decisions relating to the peaceful 
settlement of disputes would also require the affirmation of seven 
Security Council votes and the permanent members unless one of the 
members was included in said dispute.
After Stettinius finished, the Soviets wanted to look the pro­
posals over and they would be ready to talk about it at the next 
meeting, Churchill said that his farmer anxieties had been removed 
and that he found the American proposal satisfactory.
52Xbid.. pp. 143-44.
to
The leaders of the three governments then turned briefly to the 
Polish question, President Roosevelt wanted to know if they should 
start this discussion or not, Stalin stated that he would like to, 
and Roosevelt suggested that the Eastern Erontier be the Curzon Line 
and that the Lwow oil fields should go to Stalin, but he would not 
insist on it. The President said that he wanted Poland to be friendly 
and have cooperative relations with the Soviet Union, Stalin replied 
that Poland should be this way with all the Allies, Prime Minister
Churchill then stated that the British recognized the London Govern­
ment, but they did not have any close relations with them, Stalin
said that the Soviets would not create a Polish government without
consulting the Polish people first and that he had already talked 
with Mikolajczyk in Moscow in 19^ 4. The meeting was then ended,
That evening a letter from President Roosevelt was prepared 
by the State Department, and Harry Hopkins was to send it to Marshal 
Stalin before bedtime. It reads
I have been giving a great deal of thought 
to our meeting this afternoon, and I want to
tell you in all frankness what is on my mind.
In so far as the Polish Government is con­
cerned I am greatly disturbed that the three
great powers do not have a meeting of minds
about the political setup in Poland, It seems 
to me that it puts all of us in a bad light 
throughout the world to have you recognizing 
one government while we and the British are 
recognising another in London, I am sure this 
state of affairs should not continue and that 
if it does it can only lead our peoples to think 
there is a break between us, which is not the 
case. I am determined that there shall be no 
breach between. ourselves-, and the Soviet Union,
Wl
Surely there is a way to reconcile our dif­
ferences .
I was very much impressed with some of 
the things you said today, particularly your 
determination that your rear must he safe­
guarded & g  your array moves into Berlin, You 
cannot, and we must not, tolerate any temporary 
government which will give your armed forces 
any trouble of this sort, I want you to know 
that I am fully mindful of this. You must 
believe me when I tell you that our people at 
home look with a critical eye on what they 
consider a disagreement between us at this 
vital state of the war. They, in effect, say 
that if we cannot get a meeting of minds now 
when our armies are converging on the common 
enemy, how can we get an understanding on even 
more vital things in the future,
I have had to make it clear to you that we 
cannot recognize the Lublin government as now 
composed, and the world would regard it as a 
lamentable outcome of our work here if we 
parted with an open and obvious divergance 
between us on this issue.
You said today that you would be prepared 
to support any suggestions for the solution of 
this problem which offered a fair chance of 
success, and you also mentioned the possibility 
of bringing some members of the Lublin govern­
ment here.
Realising that we all have the same anxiety 
in getting this matter settled, I would like to 
develop your proposal a little and suggest that 
we invite here to Yalta at once Mr, Brerut and 
Mr. Osubka-Morawski from the Lublin government 
and also two or three from the following list of 
Poles, which according to our information would be 
desirable as representatives of the other elements 
of the Polish people in the development of a new 
temporary government which all three of us could 
recognize and support* Archbishop Sapieha of 
Cracow, Vincente Witos, Mr, Zurlowski, Professor 
Buyak, and Professor Kutseba. As a reason of the 
presence of these Polish leaders here, we could 
jointly agree with them on a provisional government 
in Poland which should no doubt include some Polish 
leaders from abroad such as Mr, Mikolajczuk,
^3
Mr, Grabski and Mr, Romerj the United States 
Government and I feel sure the British Govern™ 
ment, as well, would then be prepared to examine 
with your conditions in which they would dis­
associate themselves from the London Government 
and transfer their recognition to the new pro­
visional government,
I hope I do not have to assure you that the 
United States will never lend its support in any 
way to any provisional government in Poland that 
would be inimical to your interests.
It goes without saying that any interim 
government which could be formed as a result of 
our Conference with the Poles here would be 
pledged to the holding of free elections in
Poland at the earliest possible date, I know
this is completely consistent with your desire 
to see a new free and democratic Poland emerge 
from the welter of this war.
Most sincerely yours,
F. D. Roosevelt53
This letter would figure in discussions later in the confer­
ence, for, in the text, President Roosevelt outlined the opinions
and suggestions of the United States which constituted policy of the 
American state.
The fourth day of the conference, February 7, the discussions 
began with another meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at 10:00 a, m, 
in the Livadia Palace, They started by approving the minutes of the 
previous day*s meeting and then discussed the utilization of the 15th 
Air Force in the Vienna-Budapest area, the reciprocal agreement for 
the prisoners of war, the supplies and equipment requested by the 
Soviet Union, the protocol on the zones of occupation in Germany and 
the administration of Berlin, the zones of limitation for the British
53Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians, pp, 157-59.
and American air operations in the advance of the Soviet Armies, 
the meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the Soviet General 
Staff which they wanted on the 8th at 3s00 p. m., and a note was 
sent to General Antonov. The report by the Combined Shipping Staffs 
that discussed the need for military shipping and the Russian require 
ments for additional ships was read. This meeting was followed by a 
Meeting of the Foreign Ministers at noon at the Yusupov Palace,
The Foreign Ministers discussed Dumbarton Oaks, the dismemberment 
of Germany, the creation of a commission to study the procedure for 
the dismemberment of Germany, the integration of the French into the 
German Control Machinery on the condition that the French were to 
receive a zone of occupation and, finally, Germany*s reparations. 
Molotov submitted the Soviet "Basic Principles of Exaction of Repar­
ations from Germany," which would be reported to the meeting of the 
Big Three that afternoon.
The fourth plenary meeting was held at AiOO p. m. in the 
Livadia Palace, The discussions were started with the reading of 
th© decisions agreed on at the Foreign Ministers meeting that morning
Decisions adopted at the meeting of the 
Three Ministers of Foreign Affairs, V, M.
Molotov, to. Stettinius and Mr, Eden,
I. Regarding the Dismemberment of Germany,
(a) A. Y. Vishinsky, Mr. Cadogan and
to. Matthews were entrusted with the prepara­
tion of the final draft of Article 12 of the 
instrument "unconditional surrender of Germany" 
having in view the insertion in the text of 
Article 12 of the word "dismemberment,"
(b) The study of the question of the pro­
cedure of the dismemberment of Germany was
referred to a committee consisting of 
Mr. Eden r Mr, ¥ inant and F. T, Gusen,
II. Regarding the zone of occupation in
Germany for France.
(a) The allotment to the French of a 
zone in Germany to be occupied by French 
occupation forces has been agreed upon,
(b) As regards to the question of the 
participation of France in the Control Com­
mission, M. V. Molotov and Mr. Stettinius 
feel it desirable to refer the question 
to the E, A, C, Mr, Eden considers it 
necessary to discuss this question now and 
give France a place on the Control Commission.
III. Regarding the Reparations to be exacted
from Germany,
(a) It was agreed that in paragraph one 
of the Soviet proposals mention should be made 
of the sacrifices borne.
(b) It was decided that the residence 
of the Reparations Committee should be in the 
city of Moscow. It was agreed that the com­
mittee should begin its work immediately upon 
the approval of the principles of the exacting 
of the reparations.
(c) It was decided that the discussion 
of the two documents relating to the matter of 
the reparations which have been submitted by 
V, M. Molotov, first, regarding the basic 
principles of exacting the reparations from 
Germany, and, second, regarding the organiza­
tion of an Allied Reparations Committee should 
be continued at the Crimea Conference.-^
Following this, Molotov then read the Soviet proposals on the 
Polish Question. The Soviets wanted the eastern frontier of Poland 
to be the Curzon Line, with a digression from it some places of five 
to eight kilometers in the favor of the Polish; the western frontier 
should be from the town of Stettin (Poland) and in the south along the 
Oder River and to remain the Neizze River in the west. The Russians
State Department, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp. 700-705.
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also felt it necessary to add some of the democratic leaders from 
Polish emigre circles into the Provisional Polish Government so that 
it would be recognized by the Allied Governments, This government 
should, as soon as possible, call for elections by the Polish people 
for the permanent organs of the Polish government. He finished by 
stating that Mr. Harriman, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr and himself were 
entrusted with the discussion of the question of enlarging the Pro­
visional Polish Government and submitting their proposals to the Big
55Three, This ended the plenary meeting for February 7i and on 
February 8, the fifth day of the conference, the day was again 
started by a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at IOjOO a, m, at 
the Livadia Palace, During this meeting, the Chiefs of Staff dis­
cussed the levels of supplies of all the petroleum products in all 
the war theaters, the overall review of the cargo and troop shipping 
positions for the remainder of 1945, the employment of the war-weary 
United States bombers against the large industrial target areas in 
Germany, and the subjects to be discussed in the first United States- 
Soviet Union Staff Meeting.
There was a meeting of the Foreign Ministers at noon in the 
Vorontsov Villa where they discussed the world security organization, 
the Yugoslavian frontiers, the Control Commission in Bulgaria and 
Hungary, reparations, and Iran.
The American and Soviet Chiefs of Staff met at 3*00 in the
55■Stettinius, Roosevelt and the -Russians, pp. 181-82.
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Yusupov Palace, The persons present were Admiral Leahy, General 
Marshal, Admiral King, Kuter, Antonov, Khudyakov, and Kuznetson,
The subject of this meeting was to discuss the military problems in 
the Far East, This was done in a series of questions and answers to 
which Antonov stated that he had no authority to give definite answers 
or promises without referring them to Stalin, but that he would give 
his own opinion. During the discussion, Antonov stated that there 
were no changes in the Soviet Projection plan for the Far East from 
those described by Harriman in October of 1944, that the Soviets 
needed the Pacific supply route left open for the Trans-Siberian 
Railroad could be knocked out, that the American help was useful 
in defending Kamchatka and Eastern Siberia, that Stalin would deter­
mine if a United States survey party could enter Kamchatka or not, 
and that the Soviets would occupy the southern part of Sakhalin as 
soon as the Japanese were defeatedj but there was no discussion on 
the United States air bases in Siberia, for Antonov needed Stalin’s 
approval for this.
At 3*30 p, m, in the Livadia Palace, President Roosevelt had 
another meeting with Marshal Stalin j and the only others present were 
Harriman, Bohlen, Molotov and Pavlov, When they talked about the air 
bases in the Far East, Stalin agreed it was all right for the United 
States to have bases at Komsomolsk or at Nikalaevsk, Stalin also 
agreed to the use of airfields and survey teams to check the damage 
in Eastern and Southeastern Europe and said that the United States
could use the airfields around Budapest, President Roosevelt agreed 
that the United States would sell ships to the Soviet Union after the 
war was over. In the discussions involving the Far East* Stalin said 
that the Soviet Union desired concessions fcr entering the war. The 
Resident said there was nothing wrong with the Soviets getting the 
southern half of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands after the wax. He 
also felt that the Russians should gain a warm water port, probably 
Dairen, Although he had not had a chance to talk with Chiang Kai-shek, 
he felt that the Russians could get Dairen and certain railroad con­
cessions or rights by either leasing them from the Chinese or by a 
commission composed of the Chinese and Russians, Roosevelt also 
suggested the idea of making Dairen a free port under an inter­
national commission, to which Stalin agreed. President Roosevelt 
then suggested the trusteeship of Korea by the United States, Soviet 
Union and the Chinese until the Koreans were able to carry on self- 
government, They both agreed that they did not want Great Britain 
in on this, for Churchill would get too upset.
Regarding the internal conditions of China, the President stated 
that the United States had been working to keep her alive, Stalin
replied that he felt China needed some new leaders around Chiang 
56Kai-shek, This ended the discussions between Roosevelt and Stalin, 
for they had another plenary meeting to attend.
The fifth plenary meeting was held at ktOO p. m. at the Livadia
56^ State Department, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp, ?66-71,
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Palace, The first discussion topic concerned the World Security 
Organization, The Foreign Ministers read a report stating that they 
had established a sub-committee to further examine the details of the 
proposals and that they would report later. In reply to Roosevelt*s 
letter of February 6 to Stalin, Mr, Molotov made certain proposals 
about the Polish question. The President stated that these proposals 
had been carefully studied and that there were no objections to part 
one in th© Polish boundaries proposal (Eastern boundary would be the 
Curzon Line with some modifications in favor of Poland); but, in 
regard to point two, the United States agreed that compensation should 
be given to Poland by Germany which would include East Prussia south 
of Koenigsberg, Upper Silesia, and up to the Oder River, but he felt 
there was little justification in the proposed expansion of the western 
boundary up to the Neisse River,
The President*s reactions to the Soviet-proposed ideas concerning 
the Polish government were that he wanted to form a Presidential Com­
mittee of three men, possibly consisting of Mr. Bierut, Mr, Grabskl 
and Archbishop Sapieha, to represent the Presidential office in the 
Polish government. This committee would undertake the task of forming 
a government consisting of representative leaders from the present 
Polish Provisional Government in Warsaw along with other democratic 
leaders from inside Poland and abroad. This government would b© 
pledged to the concept of holding free elections in Poland as soon as 
there were favorable conditions, and of forming a Constituent Assembly
50
to draft a new Polish Constitution under which a permanent government 
would be elected, Roosevelt finished by stating that when the Polish 
Government of Rational Unity was formed, the three governments would 
recognise it as the Provisional Government of Poland*
Churchill then delivered the British proposals for Poland, He 
agreed with the Curzon Line with slight adjustments for the eastern 
border, while, in the west, Poland would include Danzig, the regions 
of East Prussia, west and south of Koenigsberg, the district of Oppeln 
in Silesia and the lands desired by Poland to the east of the Oder 
River, Churchill added that all the Germans in this area were to be 
repatriated to Germany, and all the Poles in Germany, in they wished, 
would be repatriated to Poland, He wanted a fully representative pro­
visional government based on all the democratic and anti-Fascist 
farces in Poland, including democratic leaders from abroad. These 
representative leaders should consult each other on the makeup of the 
provisional government* and V, M, Molotov, Mr, Harriman and Sir Archi­
bald Clark Kerr should talk with these people and submit their con­
clusions for the consideration of the Big Three, Also, as soon as 
possible, the provisional Polish government would hold "free and un­
fettered" elections based on universal suffrage and the secret ballot, 
with all democratic parties having the right of participating,^
Molotov wanted the Lublin government to be recognized and their
57Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians, pp. 209-10,
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leaders included in the new government, plus the Soviet concept of 
Poland's-.western "boundary. He agreed on the methods by which the 
Poles should hold their elections, Stalin merely wanted to enlarge 
the present Lublin government instead of establishing a new one,
i
Then Churchill suggested that the Foreign Ministers meet every 
three months in order to keep everyone well informed about changing 
conditions* All three leaders agreed to this and decided that the 
first meeting should be. held in London,
Stalin wanted to know about Yugoslavia and Greece, Prime 
Minister Churchill informed him that Tito was to be the Premier,
Dr, Ivan Subasitch was to be his Foreign Minister, and the King was 
to form a new government. In Greece, Churchill was afraid that all 
the different factions would not be represented, for they had not 
learned to have necessary discussions and cooperate. The meeting was 
then adjourned, and at 9*00 p, in, that evening there was a big dinner 
at the Yusupov Palace with the Soviets as the host. The meal included 
twenty-five courses, forty-five toasts, and lasted until after midnight. 
The conversation was general} thus, no business was carried on.^ The 
late hours kept at this meeting were nothing new to the Soviets, Stalin 
told President Roosevelt on February k that he and his staff followed 
the custom of working all night until 5*00 a, m., sleeping until 
10s00 a, m,, and then resuming work again. He reported that they did 
this seven days a week.^
59Xbid., p. 115, Ibid.
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At 11s00 the next morning, February 9» the sixth day of the 
conference, the Combined Chiefs of Staff held their meeting, This 
was a meeting consisting of both the United States and the British,
The discussions covered the drafting of the final report to President 
Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill which included the American 
remarks that they appreciated the help of the British Chiefs of 
Staff, At noon, this group met with the President and the Prime 
Minister, reporting that in conjunction with the Russian and other 
Allies, they sought to bring Germany and Japan to an "unconditional 
surrender” at the earliest possible date.^
Also at noon, there was a meeting of the Foreign Ministers 
at the Livadia Palace, The-points which were still before them 
involved the Dumbarton Oaks matters and the report by the sub-committee 
on the form of the invitations and some other details for the arrange­
ments of the United Nations Conference to be held in the near future. 
They also had to consider the questions of reparations, Poland, Iran, 
and those dealing with the Yugoslav frontiers. Following this, there 
was a meeting of the American and Soviet Chiefs of Staff at 3*30 p, m,f 
which was also held at the Livadia Palace, They talked over what had 
been done and said at the recent meeting between tbs President and 
Marshal Stalin,^
At 4:00 p, mB, the sixth plenary meeting got underway, with
State Department, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp, 827-33. 
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Molotov presenting a new idea for the Polish problem# He stated 
that the Lublin government should be reorganized with the inclusion 
of the democratic leaders from Poland itself and those abroad# He 
also agreed that the new government would pledge to hold free elec­
tions so that the government should be recognized* The Big Three 
then decided to exchange ambassadors•in order to be informed about 
the internal conditions of Poland arid to keep track on how things
* 63were going.
The Big Three also decided on the '‘British Revised Formula 
on Poland#" This Formula read?
A new situation has been created by the 
complete liberation of Poland by the Red Army,
This calls for the establishment of a Pro­
visional Polish Government more broadly based 
than was possible before the recent liberation 
of western Poland# The Provisions, 1 Government 
now functioning in Poland should be reorganized 
on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion 
of democratic leaders from Poland itself and 
from those living abroad. This new government 
will then be called the Polish Provisional 
Government of National Unity# Mr. Molotov,
Mr. Harriman and Sir Clark Kerr, are authorized 
to consult in the first instance in Moscow with 
members of the present provisional government 
and with other democratic leaders from within 
Poland and from abroad with a view to the re­
organization of the present government along the 
above lines. This Polish Provisional Government 
of National Unity would be pledged to the holding 
of free and unfettered elections as soon as prac­
ticable on the basis of universal suffrage and 
secret ballot, In these elections all democratic
Winston Churchill, The Second World War (6 vols,, Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1-9^ 8).» P« 925*
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and anti-Nazi parties would have the right 
to take part and to put forth candidates.
When a Polish Provisional Government of 
National Unity has teen properly formed in 
conformity with the above, the three govern- 
ments will then accord it recognition»®4
The Foreign Ministers were in disagreement on the section 
where the ambassadors from each country would stay in Warsaw to see 
that the elections were actually "free and unfettered,” so they 
left this to-be decided by the three governments at the next plenary
meetinge
Following the meeting, a tripartite meeting was held for 
drafting the.agreements regarding liberated prisoners of war and 
civilians. This was held at the Vorontsov Villa at 4*30 p, m,, and 
those present were Deane, Page, Archer and Novikov, At 10*30 p. m, 
that same evening, the Foreign Ministers had another meeting in the 
Yusupov Palace. Their subject dealt with Poland and the Declaration 
on Liberated Areas. They talked over what had happened in the plenary 
meeting that afternoon and what was said regarding decisions made on 
the Polish question.
At noon the next day, February 10, the seventh day of the con­
ference, the Foreign Ministers had another meeting. They again dis­
cussed Poland, the Declaration on Liberated Europe, Yugoslavia, 
reparations, the communique on the Crimea Conference, the world 
organization, the Austro-Yugoslav frontier, the Yugoslav-Italian
Stettinius, Roosevelt and the .Russians, pp. 247-48,
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frontier, the Yugoslav-Bulgarian frontier, and Iran,
The seventh plenary meeting was held at *fs00 p, m, at the 
Livadia Palace. President Roosevelt stated that he wanted to pro­
pose a small amendment to the paragraph dealing with the frontiers 
of Poland because of the American Constitution. Thus, the first 
words were changed to "The Three Heads of Government," instead of
"The Three Powersj" and in the second sentence he wanted to sub-
&*■>stitute the word "feel" for "agree." Another argument started 
over German reparations. Both President Roosevelt and Prime Minister 
Churchill refused to have a stated amount in the papers, not even ii* 
the unpublished ones, Stalin stated that he wanted two decisions.
One, that it was agreed that in principle Germany should pay repara­
tions, and second, that the Reparations Commission scheduled to sit 
at Moscow should fix the amount and take into consideration the 
American-Soviet proposal that there should be a total of twenty 
billion dollars with fifty per cent going to the Soviet Union. The 
British still felt committed by the mentioning of a specific amount, 
and Roosevelt did not like the word "reparations," for in America one 
might think this meant money only. At this time, Harry Hopkins passed 
the President a note which stated:
The Russians have given in so much at this 
conference that I don*t think we should let 
them down. Let the British disagree if they 
want to and continue their disagreement at 
Moscow, Simply say it is all referred to the
. p . 721.
56
Reparations Comission with the minutes to 
show the British disagree about any mention 
of the ten b i l l i o n , 7
Next, the subject of the French obtaining an occupation zone
was discussed* The President finally agreed with Churchill that the
French should be given a zone and a position on the control commission.
Surprisingly, Stalin agreed, too. Stettinius stated that "the President
never told me just how and when he had persuaded Stalin to make this
6?major concession which was announced so suddenly," ' Stalin also 
agreed that the Tito-Subasitch agreement should go immediately into 
force and that the members of the Skupschina (the last Yugoslav Legis­
lature ) who had not collaborated with the Germans could be included into 
the Vetch (the Anti-Fascist Association of National Liberation). Marshal 
Stalin added that he agreed to the actions of the anti-Fascist Vetch,
and they would be subject to the confirmation by the Constituent Assem-
,, 68 bly.
The discussion then turned to the Montreux Convention, Stalin 
wanted the first meeting of the Foreign Ministers, after the Crimea 
Conference, to consider revising the idea that the Dardanelles could 
be shut down, not only in a time of war but when they felt there was a 
threat of war. This was agreed on by the Big Three,
66Robert Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (New Yorki Harper.
19W), PP. 861-62.
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Just before the conference ended, President Roosevelt announced 
that he would have to leave Yalta by 31OG p. m. the next day. Thus, 
a drafting committee prepared the Conference’s Communique for signing 
by the Big Three. That evening Prime Minister Churchill gave a dinner.
The final day of the conference, February 11, the eighth plenary 
meeting was held in the Livadia Palace at noon. The Communique was 
discussed} the Soviets suggested that no mention be made of the voting 
procedure that Roosevelt had proposed, aid this was agreed on.
There was a final Tripartite luncheon meeting held at 1:00 p. m. 
in the Livadia Palace, The delegations had lunch, and the papers were 
signed. At ^ :20 p. i,, the Foreign Ministers held their last meeting 
to approve the summary of the. proceedings of the conference.
The night of the ilth, the President spent at Sevastopal. The 
next morning he drove to the airport and took a flight to Egypt where 
he boarded a cruiser in the Great Bitter lake (on the Suez Canal),
On the 13th, he entertained King Farouk of Egypt and Emperor Haile 
Selassie of Ethiopia. On the l^ th, the President had a luncheon for 
King Ibn Saud of Saudia Arabia, The following day he arrived at 
Alexandria and had a talk with Churchill and John Wlnani, He then 
left for Algiers where he had a discussion with Kirk, Caffery and 
Hewitt. On the 19th* the President’s ship passed through the Gibraltar 
Strait where the ship detected the activity of submarines. The follow­
ing day, the 20 th, Major General Edwin M. Hats on, who was the Secretary
69Department of State, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, p. 931.
See Appendix A,
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and aid to the President, died at sea. On the 2?th, the ship put in
at an East-Coast port, and the President arrived in Washington by
70social train on February 28.
The major decisions at Yalta fall into three categories i those
dealing with the United Nations, those regarding Europe, and those
involving the Fax East.* In the first category, Stalin did not want
certain nations to be admitted to the General Assembly because they
did not have diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, President
Roosevelt replied that they did help the Allies by supplying them with
raw materials. The Big Three finally agreed that they would accept
71any nation that declared war against Germany by March 1, 1945.
Byrnes felt that the United States should have more than one
vote if the Soviets had three. Stalin agreed on this in a note
answering Roosevelt's suggestion of February 10, but in a cable from
Hopkins to Byrnes after they left the conference, Hopkins said there
was no mention of this in the Official Communique and that It should
not be discussed even in private, It was also reported that the
President never wanted to talk about it, and the subject was never
72to be mentioned again. President Roosevelt was also reported as 
saying that the colonial system meant war and that he was against
^New York Times, March 1, 1945.
71r Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, pp. 38-39.
^Ibid., p. 41,
*See Appendix B .
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that. When the United Nations was established, there would be no
73need for spheres of influence. Later, Churchill informed Roose­
velt that he believed that the President was attempting to destroy 
the British Empire, and Churchill stated that the Empire meant to 
hold its own.'
The category of the European decisions can be broken dorm into 
two separate parts, Germany and Poland. Stalin, who wanted a set 
figure in regard to German reparations, felt that President Roose­
velt had sided with the British; and he was upset. But, when the
final protocol came out, the figures were included which showed that
7*5Roosevelt had sided with Stalin and left Britain dissenting. The 
Soviets also wanted to exact the German reparations by the with-
r
drawal of factories, machinery, machine tools, railways, investments 
in foreign enterprises, and a cut of the German industry by eighty 
per cent. The payments were to be made annually for ten years and 
were to go only to those countries that either lost or had damages 
to factories, land, homes and personal property. The countries* 
priority was established on the basis of their help in the winning
■ v  *
of the war and the value of their direct material losses. Thus, the 
Soviet Union was to get half of the total reparations, which made its 
portion ten billibn dollars. This was also a decision made in favor
73Wilraot, The Struggle for Europe, p. 635.
?4Xbld,. p. 635.
^Ibid., p. 4?.
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of the Soviets. The "Declaration on Liberated Europe” provided for 
"free and unfettered elections" for the liberated nations; this 
was a concession by the Soviets. Another concession made by Stalin 
was in regard to the French obtaining a zone of occupation in Germany. 
Stalin did not feel the French should have anything to do with German 
territory because of their inability to contribute during the war.
But he did let them have a zone, which was allotted by the United 
States and Great Britain, He also agreed to let the French have a 
part in the Allied Control Council. McNeill states*
One reason why the German question was 
handled so unsatisfactorily at Yalta was the 
pressure of other business. American atten­
tion was focused primarily upon the United 
Nations Organization; and the problem of 
Poland usurped an entirely disproportionate 
amount of time.77
The other section from the agreements regarding Europe was in 
relation to Poland. President Roosevelt suggested that the Soviets 
leave out the Lwow area with its oil fields and use the Lwow line, but 
Stalin wanted the boundary extended to the Neisse River and the Lublin 
Committee to set up the Polish government. Stalin got his way in most ’ 
of the boundary questions for Poland, but the real debate was over the 
future government of Poland, Stettinius presented a paper referring 
to the Atlantic Charter principle^-the right of all peoples to choose
^Stephen Borsody, The Triumph of Tyranny (London* Cape, i960), 
p. 181.
77' McNeill, America, Britain and Russia, p. 551 •
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their f orris of government. Stalin finally gave in to the American
idea for the reorganization of the Polish government and holding free
elections in a democratic method. The President said they wanted
this to be beyond question* as pure as Caesar*s wife. Stalin replied
that even she had some sins, and Roosevelt answered that he hoped she
78had fewer than this declaration would have. In a letter to Stalin,
during the conference, Roosevelt stated the exact position of the
United States and added that he was determined there would be no split
over the Polish question. Thus, Stalin got most of what he wanted and
so did Roosevelt and Churchill.
Of the three areas of decisions at Yalta, those dealing with
the Soviets* entry into the Japanese war are the most controversial.
Stalin, in October of 1943, told Cordell Hull that the Soviets would
enter the Japanese war when Germany was defeated. Harriman also
79received this view from Stalin. * '  But with the intelligence reports
the War Department was receiving, it was believed the United States
needed this agreement in writing. The United States intelligence
estimated the strength of the Japanese Army to be about 5,000,000
officers and men— 2,000,000 in Japan proper, 2,000,000 in Manchuria,
Korea, China and Formosa, and over 200,000 in Burma, Thailand and
French Indo-China, with some 500,000 in the Philippines and more than
80100,000 in the bypassed Pacific Islands, It was a common belief
78
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among many high-ranking American officials that the Japanese would
81fight to the ’’last ditch." A series of prepared recommendations 
regarding Russia’s involvement in the Pacific War had been given to 
President Roosevelt, One such note was before the President at Yalta, 
It was dated January 22, 19^5 f and it reads
The agreed over-all objective in the war 
against Japan has been expressed as follows*
To force the unconditional surrender of 
Japan by
(i) Lowering the Japanese ability and will 
to resist b y  establishing sea blockades, con­
ducting intensive air bombardment, and 
destroying Japan’s naval strength,
(2; Invading and seizing objectives in 
the industrial heart of Japan,$2
Another note, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was dated January 23, 
and was also given to the President at the conference. It read*
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have been guided 
by the following basic principles in working 
toward the U.S.S.R, entry into the war against 
Japan, Russia’s entry on as early a date as 
possible consistent with her ability to engage 
in offensive operations is necessary to provide 
maximum assistance to our Pacific operations,83
The note went on to say that the Russians should defeat the Japanese 
in Manchuria and conduct air operations against Japan proper in colla­
boration with the United States Air Forces based in eastern Siberia and 
cause maximum interference with the Japanese sea traffic between Japan
81
New York Times, February h, 19^ 5.
82Harriman, "Our Wartime Relations with the Soviet Union and the 
Agreements Reached at Yalta," p, 3^7*
Ibid.. p. 373.
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and the mainland of Asia,
Roosevelt wanted the Russians in the war because he felt that 
their participation in the Far East would insure their sincere co­
operation in a united, peaceful world. He had also been warned by
his Chiefs of Staff that without Soviet aid, it might cost the
8kAmericans a million casualties to defeat Japan, Victory had to be 
as quick as possible, for, as long as the Japanese continued the war, 
the United States was limited in its operations in other areas of the 
world. The United States was running short on manpower resources in 
the early months of 19^ 5» and an agreement with the Soviets would 
give the added support needed for the defeat of Japan, Thus, an 
agreement was reached at Yalta whereby the Soviets were to enter the 
war against Japan on the side of the Allies within two or three months 
after the defeat of Germany on conditions involving territorial gains 
(Sakhalin, Dairen, and Port Arthur) and concessions involving rail­
roads in Manchuria to which the Chinese government had to agree,
This agreement was kept secret until 1955*
One of the sharper criticisms against the agreement is that the 
United States had the atomic bomb and, thus, did not need Soviet aid.
A letter from the commanding general, who was working with the atomic 
bomb project, to the Chiefs of Staff on December 30, 19kk, stated:
It is now reasonably certain that our oper­
ation plans should be based on the gun type 
bomb, which, it is estimated will produce the
Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe, p, 6 k l,
6k
equivalent of a ten thousand ton TNT explo­
sion. The first bomb, without a previous 
full scale test which we do not believe will 
be necessary should be ready about the 1st 
of August, 19^ 5* second one should be
ready by the end of the year and succeeding 
ones at , . . intervals there after.
Our previous hopes that an implosion 
type of bomb might develop in the late spring 
have now been dissipated by scientific diffi­
culties which we have not as yet been able 
to solve. . . .  We should have sufficient 
material for the first implosion type bomb 
sometime in the latter part of July.1
The President had been informed of this situation along with
suggestions from the State Department and War Department regarding
Russia’s entry into the war. The first bomb was successfully
exploded in New Mexico on July 16, 19^ 5# but no one could say for
certain if it would work before the agreements at Yalta, Winnacker
states that "agreements with the U.S.S.R. were . , • likely to raise
86fewer problems than no agreements at all," He was referring to 
the fact that what else could be done? No one was actually sure 
that the bomb would work.
Other criticisms of the Yalta agreements center around certain 
individuals who were present. Many wondered about the role of Harry 
Hopkins and how much influence he actually had on the President, It 
has been reported -that Hopkins did not originate policy and then talk 
the President into it, "He made It his job to provide a sounding 
board for discussion of the best means of attaining the goals that
85.State Department, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, p. 383*
86Winnacker, "Yalta— Another Munich?", p. 531,
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Ort
the President set for himself,” { Hopkins was also reported to look 
to the immediate, rather than the long-range results, and that Roose-
QO
velt used him as an implementer rather than as a planner. At the 
Malta Conference, Hopkins was sickj and Dr, Me Intire told him to 
stay in bed. He remined ill during the Yalta Conference, and he 
stayed in bed under doctor*s orders, except for the plenary meetings. 
Another person, Chester Bohlen, who was at the conference, was 
the President’s personal interpreter and advisor at the conference.
He also was the United States delegation*s note-taker for the con­
ference, and his work appears in the State Department’s official 
record of the Yalta Conference,
Probably the most controversial person at the Conference was 
Alger Hiss, In 19^ 8, the House Committee on Un-American Activities 
uncovered a Soviet spy ring in Washington, A man known by Hiss as 
George Crosley was a known member of the Communist Party from 1931 
to 1938; from 193^  to 1937 he was in an underground organization 
among the government workers. He was reported to have received 
government documents in a briefcase, to have had them microfilmed 
and then returned the case and documents to his source, who would 
then return the documents to the office. Hiss knew George Crosley, 
whose real name was Chambers, for at least ten months. The two 
appeared to have had a close relationship, for Hiss let Chambers use
87'Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p, 212,
88-rv 4 A :CIbid,, P« 5*
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his home and car, While under oath, Chambers named Hiss as a member
of the pre-war Communist E^ trty and the source for the stolen documents.
The nature of the documents was highly confidential and classified
Top Secret by the State Department, The most important ones came
from the office of the Assistant Secretary of State, Francis B.
Sayre, Hiss denied that he knew that Chambers was a Communist, and
89he said that he himself was not one. Hiss was never convicted of 
being either a Communist or a spy, but he was prosecuted for perjury 
and convicted and sentenced to prison in January of 1950, The impor­
tant question is, what was Hiss*s role at the Yalta Conference?
Bohlen reported to the committee in the Hiss case that "I am abso­
lutely certain that Hiss never saw President Roosevelt in a capacity 
of advisor to him and never had any interviews with him except that
first one when the President met the whole delegation before the
90opening of the conference,Hiss was reported to be against the
ideas of Stalin in regard to the limitation of the great-power veto
in the United Nations, and he also felt that France and China should
91be included as sponsoring nations for -the United Nations,
The question of the President's health during the conference is 
also a target for criticism of the Yalta Conference, While the
89House Committee on Un-American Activities, 80th Cong,, 2nd 
Sess,, Washington, 19^ 8, p. 3*
9°Ibia.. p. 20.
New York Times. March 18, 1955.
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President was at Hyde Bark during the Christmas season in 19^ 3, he 
caught influenza and had acute attacks of respiratory infection 
during the weeks that followed. To reduce the strain on his heart,
Dr, MeIntire, the President’s personal physician, prescribed a gradual 
reduction in weight amounting to about ten pounds. The President took 
so much pride in his flat stomach that he continued to go beyond the 
dietary requirements as prescribed. On May 10, 19^ 4, the President 
had a full physical examination by Doctors Harper, Duncan, Dickens, 
Behrens and Bruenn and was reported to be in good health, When the 
President left Washington on his trip to Yalta, he had a severe cold 
and during the trip he rested often. Dr, MeIntire states that the 
President was suffering from sinus infections which made his appear­
ance look bad, but he had greatly improved by the time he reached
92Malta.' During the conference, his doctor reported that Roosevelt
93was fatigued, but there was no loss of vigor and clarity, A former
executive aid to Roosevelt, Jonathan Daniels, states that it was his
job to screen the pictures taken of the President by the Army Signal
Corps at Yalta, which were to be released to the press. Some of the
gif,
photos show him marked by "deadly haggard weariness,”' Dr, MeIntire
stated that there were also some very good photos.
When the President returned to Washington, he gave a speech in
Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p, 22,
93^McIntire, White House Physician, p. 217,
^New York Times. April 13, 1957.
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Congress in which he stated that during the trip he was in good 
health* About a month later, on April 12, 19^ 5» President Roose­
velt died at Warm Springs, Georgia, Dr, Mclntire reported that "the 
President never had a stroke, never had any serious heart condition
and never underwent other operations than the removal of a wen and
96the extraction of an infected tooth," He added that the President’s
heart functioned strongly to the last. Dr, Mclntire stated that the
President died of a massive introcerebral hemorrhage which ruptured
into the subarachnoid space. There was never an autopsy performed.
During the actual conference at Yalta, the press in America
had little information! practically everything was kept secret. By
February 5» the press speculated that the conference was being held
somewhere in the Black Sea area and felt they knew some of the probable
issues that would be discussed. They also felt that it was all right
to keep the meetings secret because of the military matters that
would likely be discussed. The papers were filled with headlines
telling of the Soviet Army’s advancement across Eastern Europe and
about the retreating Germans, The papers expressed a great faith in
President Roosevelt, and the New York Times described him as " , , ,
one of the greatest American leaders of all time and perhaps an even
96higher prestige abroad than at home,"
On February 13» the results of the Yalta Conference were presented
96^Mclntire, White House Physician, p, 15, ‘
^New York Times, February 4, 19^5 •
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to Congress,* The New York Times reported that "the Big Three
statement (papers) won "bipartisan applause today in Congress, Both
Democrats and Republicans said that it held out high hope for future 
97peace.”7 Roosevelt felt that the Yalta agreements were a good start
toward the goal of world peace and that the conference was a turning 
98point in the war,' The Omaha World Herald reported on February 14 
that "American response to the Crimea Conference has been a feeling 
of relief, an upsurge of hope for the success of international coop­
eration, and a pat on the back to President'Roosevelt for a job well 
99done,”77 But there were those who looked on the conference with a 
skeptical eye. Senator Burton K, Wheeler, a Democrat from Montana, 
felt that this was the greatest victory for Stalin and for Russian 
imperialism. There were supporters for both sides of the argument. 
Following the surrender of Germany, May 8, 1945, another top- 
level conference was held at Potsdam, near Berlin, This meeting was 
attended by Marshal Stalin, President Chiang Kai-shek, President 
Harry S, Truman, and Prime Minister Clement Attlee, During this 
conference, the former European Advisory Commission was replaced by 
the new Council of Foreign Ministers which represented China, Great 
Britain, the Soviet Union, the United States, and France, The details
^Ibid., February 13, 1945.
^Wilmot, "Was Yalta a Calamity?", p. 7,
^  Omaha World Herald, February 14, 1945,
*See Appendix C,
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of the control of the occupation zones in Germany were worked out 
along with the reparations question.
But "before the Potsdam Conference, Hurley, the United States 
Ambassador to China, was sent to Moscow to ask Stalin when Chiang 
could be told of the agreements and relations started between the 
Reds and the Chinese National Government could be started as pre­
scribed at Yalta, Stalin wanted to wait for about two months, and 
Hurley agreed.
On August 6, 19^ 5, the United States dropped the atomic bomb 
on Hiroshima, Two days later, August 8, the Soviet Union declared 
war on the Japanese Empire, On August 14, the Soviets and National 
Chinese Government negotiated the Sino-Soviet Agreements, The Soviets 
obtained privileges in railroads and ports, but they fully recognized 
the National Governments sovereignty in both China and Manchuria.*^*
In the years that f ollowed, the Soviet Union repeatedly vio­
lated the Yalta Agreements. In Bulgaria, the Soviet Government, 
with the help of the local Communist Party, unilaterally subverted 
the representative democratic process. In 1945, Soviet authorities 
interfered in the internal affairs of Bulgaria’s largest political 
party by demanding and obtaining the replacement of Dr. G. M. Dimitrov 
as the Secretary General of the Agrarian Union, In Hungary, the 
Soviets, with the help of the Hungarian Communist Party, armed forces
^^Harriman, "Our Wartime Relations with Russia," p. 375#
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in Hungary* The Catholic Youth Organization was dissolved in June
of 19 6^? Soviet armed forces arrested Bela Kovacs, who was a member
of the Parliament and the Secretary of the Smallholders Party, in
February of 19^7 S they forced the resignation of Prime Minister Nagy
102
in May, and Hungary conformed to Soviet domination by 19^7 • In
Rumania, Premier Radscu's interim representative government was
overthrown and a Communist-controlled regime was installed from
February to March of 19^5i Premier Groza1 s office remined by his
defiance of the King’s demands to resign in August5 and there were
Soviet interferences with the occupational authorities in the elec-
103tion campaign of 19^6 9 Finally, in Poland, the Polish Peasant 
Party got only 28 of the W f  seats in the government as a result of 
Soviet activity. On July 6, 1950, the Soviet-controlled governments 
of Poland and East Germany signed an agreement making the Oder-Neisse 
line the definitive German-Polish boundary, and in 1952 the elections 
were the single-slate Soviet type, and there was not even a token of 
representative government permitted as the Constitution of July 22,
104
1952, was approved.
Some persons questioned the legality of the secret agreement 
concerning the Soviets’ entry into the Japanese war. Stephen Ban 
states that in this document, neither the form, contents, nor 
terminology stipulate when it would come into force, nor is there
102Committee on Foreign Affairs, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess,, Washing­
ton, 1953,.. 39..
103rbia.. 4o. 10hbid., 43.
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anything said about its ratification or termination. The document 
was signed with the leaders* signatures, but without the official 
titles of their respective governments. The section regarding the 
land to go to Russia was against the Sino-Soviet Agreement of 192*1*; 
and, therefore, the Russian claims were questionable as to their 
validity. Pan concluded his study by stating*
In considering the Yalta Agreement as a 
whole, however, its legal aspects and implica­
tions deserve careful examination. This is 
because this "Leaders* Agreement" was signed 
in such an unusual manner, as has been pointed 
out; because it assumed the acceptance by an 
ally of the claims of another ally; because 
it is at variance with several outstanding 
international agreements such as the Nine- 
Power Treaty, the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1924, 
the Atlantic Charter and the Cairo Declaration; 
and because it also involves the Japanese Peace 
Treaty as well as the very "validity" of the 
Yalta Agreement itself. Furthermore, the con­
stitutionality of the Yalta Agreement has been 
raised by some members of the Senate who ques­
tioned the authority of the President of the 
United States of America, as a "leader" of one 
of the "Three Great Powers." The questions of 
ratification, duration and abrogation of this 
agreement are still cloudy. Such loopholes may 
lead to further legal and political complica­
tions in international relations.105
When the Yalta official protocol and the secret agreement with 
Russia were released in the spring of 1955» Winston Churchill stated 
that he found mistakes in the United States version of what happened 
at Yalta, He was specifically referring to the unfriendly sentiments
 ^^Stephen Pan, "Legal Aspects of the Yalta Agreement," Journal 
of International Law. XLVI (January, 1952), 59.
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attributed to him in regard to the Polish people#*^ Later, an ex-
State Department historian. Dryton Barron, charged that the Yalta
107Papers were slanted by the omission of certain documents# He 
stated that he was the original compiler of the papers for the State 
Departments he was dismissed for insubordination# This view had been 
expressed by others who feel that there might be some more secret 
documents that are still unpublished, but for right now this is just 
spec illation, for there seems to be really nothing to substantiate 
these charges#
There are may different theories attributed to the failure or 
the breakdown of the Yalta Agreements# Some feel that it was a con­
spiracy; they feel that Roosevelt sold out half of Europe to Stalin 
as the result of Communist work in the United States State Department, 
a theory popularized by McCarthy, Others, like Elliot Roosevelt, 
have the idea that it failed because President Roosevelt died, for
they believe his ideals and statesmanship would have been sufficient
108
to keep the world unity during the post-war period.
Still others feel that failure at Yalta was due to an Anglo-American 
antagonism. Critics have attacked Roosevelt, Churchill, Stalin, Hopkins, 
Hiss, and practically everyone else connected with the conference. The 
Departments of State and War have been accused of negligence in giving
*^New York Times# March 18, 1955«
* ^ Ibld,, February 5* 1956.
^^Borsody, The Triumph of Tyranny, p# 185#
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the President Information which led- him the wrong way. Some take a 
more realistic approach to the problem. They feel the failure of the 
Yalta Agreements in the years following this important conference was 
not due to the United States but that it failed because the Soviets 
failed to keep their promises which were made at Yalta by the signing 
of the protocol.
The Yalta documents represent one of the most controversial 
issues resulting from the Second World War, The conference was held 
in secretj not even the press or press photographers were invited.
In fact, the pictures taken at Yalta were taken by members of the 
American Army Signal Corps, The official conference communique was 
carefully worded, only giving the "bare essentials," Immediate reac­
tion, in the main, was favorable, A large number of Americans felt 
that there was ’hope," as the newspaper articles show. But, as the 
agreements reached at Yalta began to fall apart, the American public 
became upset. The McCarthy brand of "red scare" that swept through 
the United States during the early 1950*s aroused the public to the 
Communist threat. When the New York Times published the "Secret 
Agreements" in the spring of 1955$ Yalta again came into the lime­
light, These "secret documents" dealing with Russia’s entry into the 
war revived the whole Yalta question. The American public asked why 
these had not been released in 19*t5« The fact of the matter is that 
there was never any official Congressional approval or full knowledge 
of what happened at Yalta, James Byrnes asked President Roosevelt
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about the secret documents, wondering if they would be put into the
form of a treaty, Roosevelt replied that this would be embodied in
109an eventual peace treaty,
Roosevelt also suggested Congressional action. In his report
to Congress on March 1, 19^ 5» the President stated*
Speaking in all frankness, the question of 
whether it is fruitful or not, lies, to a 
great extent, in your hands, for unless you, 
here in the Halls of the American Congress, 
concur in the general conclusions reached at 
the place called Yalta, and give them your 
active support, the meeting will not have 
produced lasting results. And that is why 
I have come before you at the earliest hour 
I could after my return, HO
President Roosevelt died soon after, and the Yalta Papers never 
did come officially before Congress for approval, Whether the Presi­
dent really intended to do this is a question that cannot be answered.
To complicate matters, there is no official peace treaty with Germany 
and Italy, The War Conferences serve in its place, especially Yalta,
The United States was bound to these agreements by President Roose­
velt’s use of the executive agreement.
The President has the right to enter into executive agreements 
as Commander-in-Chief for military agreements; and, because of his power 
over foreign relations (that is, chief diplomat), he can enter into 
political agreements without the advice and consent of the Congress,
109Pan, "Legal Aspects of the Yalta Agreements,” p. 51*
110n>ia.. v . :ks.
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Although the Constitution does not specifically authorize the Presi­
dent to be the director-in-chief of foreign affairs or grant the 
power of executive agreements, he may make treaties contingent upon 
the approval of the Senate. Thus, by implied and/or expanded powers, 
President Roosevelt was able to use successfully the executive agree­
ment. In 1953, Senator Bricker attempted to challenge this executive 
power by sponsoring a proposed Constitutional amendment. This amend­
ment, if passed, would require Congressional approval of executive
agreements. The Bricker Amendment failed, as did its "watered-down"
111substitute on February 26, 195^ .
With regard to President Roosevelt and the conferences from the
Atlantic Charter to Yalta, Congress played a very small role, either
as a critic or as a participant, Roland Young sums up the role of
Congress in this list of conferences by stating:
Congress did not participate in these 
military and military-political conferences.
It was not invited, and it did not ask to be 
invited; Congress seemed to consider that 
the prerogative of making commitments at .. _
such conferences belonged to the President . . .
The Congress, along with the American public, was accustomed to 
President Roosevelt’s full use of his presidential powers. This pattern 
started during the Depression and continued throughout Roosevelt’s 
almost four complete administrations. Each conference, the Atlantic
111Thomas Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (New 
York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1968), p. 828.
112Roland Young, Congressional Politics in the Second World War 
(New York: Columbia University Press,1956), p. 1^ 7.
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Charter, the Casablanca Conference, the Moscow and Teheran Conference, 
mark the way to Yalta, almost like stepping stones a-cross a creek.
Thus, by the use of the executive agreement and thetopics discussed 
during the pre-Yalta conferences, the Crimea Conference was the cul­
mination of the military, military-political agreements already made. 
President Roosevelt had become accustomed to using the executive agree­
ment backed by his justification that he expected an "official” peace 
treaty to mark the end of World War II. It is interesting to note
that after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt liked being referred
113to as Commander-in-chief, rather than President,
The question soon arose as to how long the United States was 
obligated to adhere to the Yalta agreements, Stephen Pan feels that 
after Roosevelt,s death, with a new administration taking office,
", , , the United States could legally consider itself no longer
H k
bound by the various Yalta understandings. President Truman
stated on April 23, 19^ 5» that ” . . .  if one part of the agreements 
which they /the Soviet Union/ had entered with President Roosevelt at 
Yalta were breached, he would consider that the entire Yalta Agreement 
was no longer binding on any of the parties interested.”*^
The discontinued adherence to the Yalta Agreements also became 
a part of the Republican political platform of 1952.
113Bemis, Diplomatic History of the United States, p, 901,
114Pan, "Legal Aspects of the Yalta Agreements," p, 59.
115Ibld.. p. 58.
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The executive agreement had been used many times before the 
Yalta Conference, and by Presidents before Roosevelt; and it will 
certainly be used in the future. But it is doubtful whether it 
will ever create the controversy that the Yalta Conference did.
This conference bound the United States, at least for a time, to 
many very important agreements. Many historians view the breakdown 
of the Yalta Agreements as one of the basic causes of the "cold war,"
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APPENDIX A 
PROTOCOL OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
OF THE CRIMEA CONFERENCE
The Crimea Conference of the Heads of the Governments of the 
United States of America, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics which took place from February 4th to ilth came 
to the following conclusionss
1. WORLD ORGANIZATION
It was decided*
(1) that a United Nations Conference on the proposed world 
organization should be summoned for Wednesday, 25th April, 1945, and 
should be held in the United States of America*
(2) the Nations to be invited to this Conference should be*
(a) the United Nations as they existed on the 8th 
February, 1945, and
(b) such of the Associated Nations as have declared war 
on the common enemy by 1st March, 1945. (For this purpose by the 
term "Associated Nation" was meant the eight Associated Nations and 
Turkey.) When the Conference on World Organization is held, the 
delegates of the United Kingdom and United States of America will 
support a proposal to admit to original membership two Soviet 
Socialist Republics, I.e., the Ukraine and White Russia,
(3) that the United States Government on behalf of Three Powers 
should consult the Government of China and the French Provisional
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Government in regard to the decisions taken at the present Conference 
concerning the proposed World Organisation,
(^ ) that the text of the invitation to he issued to all the 
nations which would take part in the United Nations Conference should 
he as follows*
INVITATION
"The Government of the United States of America, on hehalf of 
itself and of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of China and of the Pro­
visional Government of the French Republic, invite the Government of
______ _ to send representatives to a Conference of the
United Nations to be held on 25th April, 19^ 5» or soon thereafter, 
at San Francisco in the United States of America to prepare a Charter 
for a General International Organization for the maintenance of inter­
national peace and security,
"The above named governments suggest that the Conference consider 
as affording a basis for such a Charter the Proposals for the Establish­
ment of a General International Organization, which were made public 
last October as a result of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, and which 
have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C 
of Chapter VI*
,MC. Voting
' i. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote,
*2, Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters 
should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members,
*3, Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters
81
should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the 
concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions 
under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of para­
graph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should 
abstain from voting.*
"Further information as to arrangements will be transmitted sub­
sequently,
"In the event that the Government of ______   desires
in advance of the Conference to present views or comments concerning 
the proposals, the Government of the United States of America will be 
pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating 
Governments,"
TERRITORIAL TRUSTEESHIP 
It was agreed that the five Nations which will have permanent 
seats on ihe Security Council should consult each other prior to the 
United Nations Conference on the question of territorial trusteeship.
The acceptance of this recommendation is subject to its being made 
clear that territorial trusteeship will only apply to (a) existing man­
dates of the League of Nations; (b) territories detached from the enemy 
as a result of the present war; (c) any other territory which might 
voluntarily be placed under trusteeship; and (d) no discussion of 
actual territories is contemplated at the forthcoming United Nations 
Conference or in the preliminary consultations and it will be a matter 
for subsequent agreement which territories within the above categories 
will be placed under trusteeship.
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ii. DECLARATION ON LIBERATED EUROPE
The following declaration has "been approved*
"The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the 
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United 
States of America have consulted with each other in the common inter­
ests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe, 
They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the 
temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of 
their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the 
domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite 
states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political 
and economic problems,
"The establishment of order in Europe and the re-building of 
national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable 
the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and 
Fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice.
This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter— the right of all peoples 
to choose the form of government under which they will live— the 
restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples 
who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations,
"To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may 
exercise these ri^its, the three governments will jointly assist 
the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite 
state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require (a) to
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establish.'conditions'of internal peacej (b) to carry out emergency 
measures for the relief of distressed peoples? (c) to form interim 
governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic 
elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible 
establishment through free elections of governments responsive to 
the will of the people? and (d) to facilitate where necessary the 
holding of such elections.
"The three governments will consult the other United Nations 
and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when 
matters of direct interest to them are under consideration,
"When* in the opinion of the three governments, conditions in 
any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in 
Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult 
together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsi­
bilities set forth in this declaration,
"By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles 
of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United 
Nations, and our determination to build in co-operation with other 
peaceloving nations world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, 
freedom and general well-being of all mankind,
"In issuing this declaration, the Three Powers express the hope 
that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be asso­
ciated with them in the procedure suggested."
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tile DISMEMBERMENT OF GERMANY
It was agreed that Article 12 (a) of the Surrender Terras for 
Germany should he amended to read as followsi
"The United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics shall possess supreme authority with 
respect to Germany. In the exercise of such authority they will take 
such steps, including the complete disarmament, demilitarisation and 
the dismemberment of Germany as they deem requisite for future peace 
and security."
The study of the procedure for the dismemberment of Germany was 
referred to a Committee, consisting of Mr. Eden (Chairman), Mr, Winant 
and Mr, Gousev, This body would consider the desirability of asso­
ciating with it a French representative,
IV. ZONE OF OCCUPATION FOR THE FRENCH AND CONTROL COUNCIL FOR GERMANY,
It was agreed that a zone in Germany, to be occupied by the 
French Forces, should be allocated to France. This zone would be 
formed out of the British and American zones and its extent would be 
settled by the British and Americans in consultation with the French 
Provisional Government.
It was also agreed that the French Provisional Government should 
be invited to become a member of the Allied Control Council for Germany,
V. REPARATION
The following protocol has been approvedi
1. Germany must pay in kind for the losses caused by her to the
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Allied nations in the course of the war. Repara,tions are to be 
received in the first instance by those countries which have borne 
the main burden of the war, have suffered the heaviest losses and 
have organised victory over the enemy,
2. Reparation in kind is to be exacted from Germany in three 
following formst
(a) Removals within 2 years from the surrender of Germany or 
the cessation of organised resistance from the national wealth of 
Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as out­
side her territory (equipment, machine-tools, ships, rolling stock, 
German investments abroad, shares of industrial, transport and other 
enterprises in Germany, etc.), these removals to be carried out 
chiefly for purpose of destroying the war potential of Germany,
(b) Annual deliveries of goods from current production for a 
period to be fixed,
(c) Use of German labour,
3. For the working out on the above principles of a detailed 
plan for exaction of reparation from Germany an Allied Reparation 
Commission will be set up in Moscow, It will consist of three rep­
resentatives—  one from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, one 
ftom the United Kingdom and one from the United States of America,
4. With regard to the fixing of the total sum of the reparation 
as well as the distribution of it among the countries which suffered 
from the German aggression the Soviet and American delegations agreed
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as follows*
"The Moscow Reparation Commission should take in its initial 
studies as a "basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet 
Government that the sum of the reparation in accordance with the 
points (a) and (b) of the paragraphs should be 20 billion dollars 
and that 50^ of it should go to the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics."
The British delegation was of the opinion that pending con­
sideration of the reparation question by the Moscow Reparation 
Commission no figures of reparation should be mentioned.
The above Soviet-American proposal has been passed to the 
Moscow Reparation Commission as one of the proposals to be considered 
the Commission.
V!. MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS
The Conference agreed that the question of the major war 
criminals should be the subject of enquiry by the three Foreign 
Secretaries for report in due course after the close of the Conference. 
Vli. POLAND
The following Declaration on Poland was agreed by the Conference.
"A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her 
complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment 
of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than 
was possible before the recent liberation of the Wester part of Poland, 
The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should
8?
therefore be reorganised on a broader democratic basis with the 
inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles 
abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Pro­
visional Government of National Unity,
"M, Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized 
as a commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with 
members of the present Provisional Government and with other Polish 
democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view 
to the reorganisation of the present Government along the above lines. 
This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged 
to the holding of free and Unfettered elections as soon as possible 
on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elec­
tions all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to 
take part and to put forward candidates,
"When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been 
properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the 
U.S.S.R,, which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present 
Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United 
Kingdom and the Government of the U.S.A. will establish diplomatic 
relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, 
and will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Govern­
ments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland,
"The three Heads of Government consider that the Eastern frontier 
of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from it in
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some regions of five to eight kilometres in favour of Poland. They 
recognise that Poland must receive substantial accessions of terri­
tory in the North and West. They feel that the opinion of the new 
Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in 
due. course in the extent of 111636 accessions and that the final 
delimitation of the Western frontier of Poland should thereafter 
await the Peace Conference.1 
Vill. YUGOSLAVIA
It was agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and to Dr. Subasic:
(a) that the Tito-Subasic Agreement should immediately be put 
into effect and a new Government formed on the basis of the Agreement,
(b) that as soon as the new Government has been formed it should 
declare t
CD that the Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation 
(AUNOJ) will be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav 
Skupstina who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with 
the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary Parliament and 
(ii) that legislative acts -passed by the Anti-Fascist 
Assembly of National Liberation (AUNOJ) will be subject to subsequent 
ratification by a Constituent Assembly?
and that this statement should be published in the communique of the 
Conference•
IX. ITALO-YUGOSLAV FRONTIER 
ITALO-AUSTRIA FRONTIER
Notes on these subjects were put In by the British delegation and
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the American and Soviet delegations agreed to consider them and give 
their views later,
X, YUGOSLAV~BULGARIAN RELATIONS
There was an exchange of views between the Foreign Secretaries 
on the question of the desirability of a Yug os la v-B ulgar ian pact of 
alliance. The question at issue was whether a state still under an 
armistice regime could be allowed to enter into a treaty with another 
state. Mr. Eden suggested that the Bulgarian and Yugoslav Governments 
should be informed that this could not be approved, Mr. Stettinius 
suggested that the British and American Ambassadors should discuss 
the matter further with Mr. Molotov in Moscow, Mr. Molotov agreed 
with the proposal of Mr. Stettinius.
XI. SOUTH EASTERN EUROIE
The British Delegation put in notes for the consideration of 
their colleagues on the following subjects:
(a) the Control Commission in Bulgaria
(b) Greek claims upon Bulgaria, more particularly with reference 
to reparations.
(c) oil equipment in Roumania.,
Xii. IRAN
Mr. Eden, Mr. Stettinius and M. Molotov exchanged views on the 
situation in Iran, It was agreed that this matter should be pursued 
through the diplomatic channel.
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XIII, MEETINGS OP THE THREE FOREIGN SECRETARIES
The Conference agreed that permanent machinery should be set up 
for consultation between the three Foreign Secretaries? they should 
meet as often as necessary, probably about every three or four months.
These meetings will be held in rotation in the three capitals, 
the first meeting being held in London,
XIV. THE MONTREUX CONVENTION AND THE STRAITS
It was agreed that at the next meeting of the three Foreign
Secretaries to be held in London, they should consider proposals
which it was understood the Soviet Government would put forward in
relation to the Montreux Convention and report to their Governments,
The Turkish Government should be informed at the appropriate moment.
The foregoing Protocol was approved and signed by the three
Foreign Secretaries at the Crimea Conference, February 11, i$&5.
E R Stettinius, Jr 
B, Mojiotob 
Anthony Eden
Part V. on Reparations occurs in the official State Department,
The Conference at Malta and Yalta, (Washington 1955)» 932-3» as an
added portion titled PROTOCOL ON THE TALKS BETWEEN THE HEADS OF THE
THREE GOVERNMENTS AT THE CRIMEAN CONFERENCE ON THE QUESTION OF THE
GERMAN REPARATION IN KIND, which was signed by Churchill, Roosevelt
and Stalin (Ctajihh) and dated also as February 11, 19^ 5# This is the
116
same wording as appeared above under part V,"
116
Department of State, op. cit,, 9?5~83«
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APPENDIX B
MAGREEMENT REGARDING ENTRY OF THE SOVIET
UNION INTO THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN, TOP SECRET”
AGREEMENT
The leaders of the three Great Powers— the Soviet Union, the 
United States of America and Great Britain— have agreed that in two 
or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe 
has terminated the Soviet Union shall enter into the war against 
Japan on the side of the Allies on condition thats
Xc The status quo in Outer-Mongolia (The Mongolian People's 
Republic) shall be preserved;
2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous 
attack of Japan in 190^ shall be restored, viz*
(a) the southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the
islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union,
(b) the commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, 
the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safe­
guarded and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the USSR
restored,
(c) the Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South-Manchurian 
Railroad which provides an outlet to Dairen shall be jointly operated 
by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese Company, it being under­
stood that the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be
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safeguarded and that China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria,
3. The Kurile Islands shall he handed over to the Soviet Union, 
It is understood that -the agreement concerning Outer-Mongolia 
and the ports and railroads referred to above will require concurrence 
of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, The President will take measures in 
order to obtain this concurrence on advice from Marshal Stalin,
The Heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that these claims 
of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has 
been defeated.
For its part the Soviet Union expresses its readiness to conclude 
with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance 
between the USSR and China in order to render assistance to China with 
its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese 
yoke,
i/i Ctajihh 
Franklin D Roosevelt 
Winston S Churchill117
February ii, 19^5
"^Department of State, op, cit,,
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APPENDIX 0 
"THE DEFEAT OF GERMANY"
We have considered and determined the military plans of the 
three Allied powers for the final defeat of the common enemy. The 
military staffs of the three Allied nations have met in daily 
meetings throughout the conference. These meetings have been most 
satisfactory from every point of view and have resulted in closer 
coordination of the military effort of the three Allied powers than 
ever before. The fullest information has been interchanged. The 
timing, scope, and coordination of new and even more powerful blows 
to be launched by our armies and air forces into the heart of Germany 
from the east, west, north, and south have been fully agreed and 
planned in detail.
Our combined military plans will be made known only as we 
execute them, but we believe that the very close working partnership 
among the three staffs attained at this conference will result in 
shortening the war. Meetings of the three staffs will be continued 
in the future whenever the need arises,
Nazi Germany is doomed. The German people will only make the 
cost of their defeat heavier to themselves by attempting to continue 
a hopeless resistance,
THE OCCUPATION AND CONTROL OF GERMANY ''
We have agreed on common policies and plans for enforcing the 
unconditional surrender terms which we. shall impose together on Nazi
Germany after German armed resistance has been finally crushed.
These terms will not be made known until the final defeat of Germany 
has been accomplished. Under the agreed plan, the forces of the three 
powers will each occupy a separate zone of Germany. Coordinated admini­
stration and control has been provided for under the plan through a 
central control commission consisting of the supreme commanders of 
the three powers with headquarters in Berlin, It has been agreed 
that France should be invited by the three powers, if she should so 
desire, to take over a zone of occupation, and to participate as a 
fourth member of the control commission. The limits of the French 
zone will be agreed by the four governments concerned through their 
representatives on the European Advisory Commission,
It is our inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism and 
Nazi-ism and to insure that Germany will never again be able to dis­
turb the peace of the world. Vie are determined to disarm and disband 
all German armed forces; break up for all time the German General Staff 
that has repeatedly contrived the resurgence of German militarism; 
remove or destroy all German military equipment; eliminate or control 
all German industry that could be used far military production; bring 
all wax criminals to just and swift punishment, and exact reparations 
in kind for the destruction wrought by the Germans; wipe out the Nazi 
Party, Nazi laws, organizations, and institutions; remove all Nazi and 
militarist influences from public office and from the cultural and 
economic life of the German people; and take in harmony such other
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measures in Germany as may be necessary to the future peace and 
safety of the world. It is not our purpose to destroy the people 
of Germany, but only when Nazi-ism and militarism have been extir­
pated will there be hope for a decent life for Germans, and a place 
for them in the comity of nations,
REPARATION BY GERMANY 
We have considered the question of the damage caused by Germany 
to the Allied Nations in this war and recognized it as just that Ger­
many be obliged to make compensation for this damage in kind to the 
greatest extent possible, A commission for the compensation of 
damage will be established. The commission will be instructed to 
consider the question of the extent and methods for compensating 
damage caused by Germany to the Allied countries. The commission 
will work in Moscow,
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE 
We are resolved upon the earliest possible establishment with 
our allies of a general international organisation to maintain peace 
and security. We believe that this is essential, both to prevent 
aggression and to remove the political, economic, and social causes 
of war through the close and continuing collaboration of all peace- 
loving peoples.
The foundations were laid at Dumbarton Oaks, On -the important 
question of voting procedure, however, agreement was not there reached. 
The present conference has been able to resolve this difficulty.
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We have agreed that a conference of United Nations should he 
called to meet at San Rranciseo in the United States on April 25»
19^ 5, to prepare the charter of such an organisation, along the 
lines proposed in the informal conversations at Dumbarton Oaks,
The Government of China and the Provisional Government of Prance 
Kill he immediately consulted and invited to sponsor invitations to 
the conference jointly with the Governments of the United States,
Great Britain, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, As 
soon as the consultation with China and Prance has been completed,
Hie text of the proposals on voting procedure will be made public,
DECLARATION ON LIBERATED EUROPE 
The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the 
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and the President of the United 
States of America have consulted with each other in the common inter­
ests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe, 
They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the 
temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of 
their three Governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the 
domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite 
states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political 
and economic problems.
The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of 
national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable 
the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of naziism and
97
fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice,
This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter— the right of all peoples 
to choose the form of government under which they will live““the 
restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples 
who. have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.
To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may 
exercise these rights, the three Governments will jointly assist the 
people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state 
in Europe where in their judgment conditions require (a) to establish 
conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency measures 
for the relief of distressed peoples; (c) to form interim governmental 
authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the 
population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through 
free elections of government responsive to the will of the people; 
and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections. 
The three Governments will consult the other United Nations and 
provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters 
of direct interest to them are under consideration.
When, in the opinion of the three governments, conditions in any 
European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe 
make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together 
on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set 
forth in this declaration.
By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of
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the Atlantic Charier, om: pledge in the declaration "by the United 
Nations, and our determination to build in cooperation with other 
peace-loving nations world order under law, dedicated to peace, 
security, freedom., and general well-being of all mankind.
In issuing this declaration, the three powers express the 
hoj>e that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may 
be associated with them in the procedure suggested,
POLAND
A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her 
complete liberation by the Red Array, This calls for the establish­
ment of a Polish provisional government whiGh can be more broadly 
based than was possible before the recent liberation of western 
Poland, The provisional government which is now functioning in 
Poland should, therefore, be recognized on a broader democratic 
basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and 
from Poles abroad. This new government should then be called the 
Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.
M, Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A, Clark. Kerr are authorized 
as a commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with mem­
bers of the present provisional government and with other Polish 
democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view 
to the reorganization of the present government along the above lines. 
This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged 
to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on
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the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elec­
tions all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to 
take part and put forward candidates.
When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been 
properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the 
U.S.S.R, which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present 
provisional government of Poland, and the Government of the United 
Kingdom and the Government of the United States of America will 
establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional 
Government of National Unity, and will exchange ambassadors by whose 
reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the 
situation in Poland.
The three heads of government consider that the eastern fron­
tier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from 
It in some regions of 5 to 8 kilometers in favor of Poland, They 
recognize that Poland must receive substantial accessions to terri­
tory in the north and west. They feel that the opinion of the new 
Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in 
due course on the extent of these accessions and that the final 
delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter 
await the peace conference,
YUGOSLAVIA
We have agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasic 
that the agreement between them should be put into effect immediately,
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and that a new government should he formed on the basis of that 
agreement.
He also recommend that as soon as the new government has been 
formed it should declare that:
(1) The Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation should be 
extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Parliament who have 
not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus 
forming a body to be known as a temporary parliament! and
(2) Legislative acts passed by the Anti-Fascist Assembly of 
National Liberation will be subject to subsequent ratification by a 
constituent assembly,
There was also a general review of other Balkan questions, 
MEETINGS OF FOREIGN SECRETARIES
Throughout the conference, besides the daily meetings of the 
heads of governments and the foreign secretaries, separate meetings 
of the three foreign secretaries and their advisors have also been 
held daily.
These meetings have proved of ihe utmost value and the Confer­
ence agreed that permanent machinery should be set up for regular 
consultation between the three Foreign Secretaries, They will, 
therefore, meet as often as may be necessary, probably about every 
3 or 4 months, These meetings will be held in rotation in the - three 
capitals, the first meeting being held in London, after the United 
Nations Conference on NorId Organization,
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UNITY FOR PEACE AS FOR WAR 
Our meeting here in the Crimea has reaffirmed our common 
determination to maintain and strengthen in the peace to come that 
unity of purpose and of action which has made victory possible and 
certain for the United Nations in this war. We believe that this is 
a sacred obligation which our governments owe to our peoples and to 
all the peoples of the world.
Only with the continuing and growing cooperation and under­
standing among our three countries and among all the peace-loving 
nations can be the highest aspiration of humanity be realized— a 
secure and lasting peace which will, in the words of the Atlantic 
Charter, "afford assurance that all the men in all the lands nay 
live out their lives in freedom from fear and want,”
Victory in this war and establishment of the proposed inter­
national organization will provide the greatest opportunity in all 
history to create in the years to come the essential conditions of 
such a peace,
Winston S Churchill
Franklin D Roosevelt 
118
J Stalin
February 11, 1945 
11 fi
New York Times. February 13, 19;t5.
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